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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation was to conduct an outcomes-based program 
evaluation for the Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola) campus of the New Orleans 
Baptist Theological Seminary. The study included one primary research question, with 
two subquestions. The primary research question asked to what extent students in the 
program developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating 
students and preparing them for effective ministry. The first subquestion asked whether 
statistically significant differences existed in the moral reasoning of students of different 
class years. The second subquestion asked whether statistically significant differences 
existed in the moral reasoning of students of different personality types.  
A cross-sectional study was conducted with students during the fall of 2005 using 
the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
instruments. All 101 program students were invited to participate in the study. To provide 
a benchmark for student scores, 30 Seminary faculty members were asked to complete 
the DIT-2. The student response rates were 94% for the DIT-2 instrument and 97% for 
the MBTI instrument. The response rate for faculty was 20%.  
After removing two outliers from the freshmen class, statistically significant 
differences were found in the principled moral reasoning scores (P scores) of freshmen 
(m = 22.146, sd = 12.002) and juniors (m = 30.274, sd = 13.165). No significant 
differences were found in moral reasoning based upon personality types. The mean P 
score among faculty members was 34.02 (sd = 15.25). In response to the primary 
research question, it was determined student scores did show moral reasoning differences 
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consistent with the program goals. Conclusions reached in this study were limited 
because of the cross-sectional design. Further research is necessary before conclusions 
may be generalized beyond the sample.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS CLARIFYING COMPONENTS 
The Angola College Program 
In 2004, the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (LSP) was the nation’s largest 
prison, housing more than 5,100 inmates. Every inmate was either convicted of a violent 
felony or classified as a habitual offender; the average Angola inmate was sentenced to 
88 years (Frink, 2004; “Confronting recidivism,” 2005). Of the inmates at LSP, 90% 
were expected to never leave the prison (Severson, 2004). 
In the early 1990s, college programs existed in hundreds of prisons across the 
country. These programs relied heavily upon federal financial aid funding, such as Pell 
grants. Congress cut funding for prison education, however, in 1995 (Karpowitz & 
Kenner, n.d.). During the conservative attempts to restructure government, many 
lawmakers viewed tax funded prisoner education as a poor investment (Nelson, 1995).  
When the federal government cut Higher Education Act funding for educational 
rehabilitation programs, Angola’s Warden, Burl Cain, began thinking of new ways to 
educate prisoners (Frink, 2004). Partnering with the Judson Baptist Association, 
Louisiana Baptist Convention, and the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary 
(NOBTS), Cain brought a privately funded theological education to the prison (Baker, 
2000).  
In 1995, a partnership between NOBTS and LSP created a college program 
offering associate and bachelor’s degrees to prison inmates. Associate degrees were first 
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awarded in 1998, and the first bachelor’s degrees were awarded in 2000 (Louisiana 
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2000). In 2004, LSP was the only prison in 
the United States offering college degrees to inmates (Louisiana Department of Public 
Safety and Corrections, 2001). The LSP campus of NOBTS was one of 16 Seminary 
extension centers and was regionally accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges 
and Schools (Frink, 2004). 
In 1997, the program’s capacity was just 50 students (Moore, 1997). There were 
104 students enrolled in 2000 (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 
2000). By 2004, the program enrolled more than 120 students. Even with increased 
enrollment space available, the number of applicants exceeded the number of students the 
program was able to enroll (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 
n.d.a). The popularity of the LSP Seminary was quite different than what Walsh (2000) 
had observed in other prisoner education programs. Walsh (2000) found prisoner 
education programs did not typically generate significant interest from prisoners. 
Because the program had been sectarian in nature, admission required at least one 
year of active involvement in one of the prison’s religious communities (Achord & 
Moore, 1998). While the Seminary was a Christian institution, Muslims had been 
admitted to the program. All LSP seminarians were required to possess a high school 
diploma or GED (Severson, 2004). The admission requirements were similar to those of 
students enrolled in the program on NOBTS’s main campus. 
Once admitted to the Seminary, each inmate had the option of earning an 
associate or bachelor’s degree in Christian Ministry (Louisiana Department of Public 
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Safety and Corrections, n.d.b). Students attended classes full-time and enrolled in 15 
hours per semester. The program had even expanded to allow students to perform 
internships served with previous Seminary graduates. To be eligible for internships, 
students must have been in the senior year of the bachelor’s program. At the time of this 
study, Angola reportedly had 67 program graduates and interns around the prison 
(Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, n.d.b). 
Graduates were credited with having a positive impact on the prison community 
and had been involved in numerous churches (Moore, 1997). There was even a Christian 
radio station, JLSP 91.7, “Incarceration Station,” within the prison. Because of the 
success, the Angola Seminary had begun sending missionaries to other prisons. The 
missionary program allowed graduates to leave the maximum security LSP and relocate 
for two years to another Louisiana correctional institution (Severson, 2004).  
The LSP Seminary had been a pioneering effort. While many other correctional 
institutions had routinely offered religious programs, LSP was unique in offering 
bachelor’s degrees, seminary degrees and in sending inmate missionaries to other 
institutions. With 90 inmate-missionaries, the program had been rather extensive 
(Severson, 2004). 
A primary goal of the Seminary had been the moral development of students. 
Warden Cain had said, “I wish other prison wardens could realize what we learned—that 
the only rehabilitation is moral rehabilitation” (Frink, 2004, p. 39). Robert Toney, a 
chaplain at Angola, also emphasized the moral nature of the Seminary program in his 
statement that “moral rehabilitation is the only rehabilitation that works. If you just have 
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education, what you have done is just created a smarter criminal. The change must come 
from within” (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108). 
Moral development had been an integral part of the NOBTS curriculum. The 
Seminary designed its curriculum around five “core values.” These values were doctrinal 
integrity, spiritual vitality, mission focus, characteristic excellence, and servant 
leadership (Academic catalog, 2005-2006, p. 2). According to Dr. Timothy Searcy, the 
Seminary’s Director of Institutional Effectiveness (personal communication, June 25, 
2005), ethics had been a feature of each of the core values. 
The Angola program was credited with creating social and moral change among 
the inmate population. In a prison where violence was an almost everyday occurrence in 
the 1990s, violence in 2005 was quite rare. While LSP was once known as the nation’s 
most dangerous prison, no murders had occurred there since 1999 (Baker, 2002). One 
inmate described the Seminary’s effect by saying, “I can now lay down at night and not 
worry about what my neighbor is going to do to me or anything like that” (Severson, 
2004, paragraph 9).  
According to Angola’s Chaplain Toney, Angola had transformed from “the most 
violent prison in America” to “the safest prison in America.” The frequency of violent 
crimes at LSP had shown a steady decline since the Seminary began its program. The rate 
of violence in Angola dropped by approximately 90% between 1996 and 2004 
(“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108). Murders and suicides completely disappeared 
from the prison (Baker, 2002). The safer atmosphere at Angola was compared to what 
Warden Cain remembered from a prior decade. “I was getting called every week when I 
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was first warden here. We had murders, we had escapes, we had suicides—loss of 
hope…” (Severson, 2004, paragraph 3). Speaking at a graduation of LSP seminarians, 
Dr. Chuck Kelley, NOBTS president, explained the moral underpinning of the 
Seminary’s mission in his statement that “God is willing to exchange our evil for his 
good” (Achord & Moore, 1998, paragraph 5). 
The Louisiana Department of Corrections attributed much of the change at LSP to 
the Seminary. According to the Department website on rehabilitation and work programs, 
“The prison in its previous unhealthy condition was known for its violence and frequent 
escape attempts. Currently, Angola displays a peaceful and safe environment, which is 
the best evidence of a successful, healthy religious program” (Louisiana Department of 
Public Safety and Corrections, n.d.b, paragraph 9).  
Cain viewed faith-based efforts as the most promising development in criminal 
rehabilitation. He said, “nothing else but [the religious programs] should get the credit 
[for Angola’s change]. We always had the educational programs. The only thing we did 
different was we brought God to Angola” (Frink, 2002, p. 39). The program was 
considered such a success in 2004 that wardens from prisons in other states were asking 
NOBTS to consider opening campuses at their prisons (Myers, 2004). Later that year, 
NOBTS opened a new campus at the Mississippi State Penitentiary and the Seminary 
began developing programs in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama (Myers, 2005). 
The creation and operation of the Angola Seminary was not easy. Some Louisiana 
legislators opposed the program (Frink, 2002). The American Civil Liberties Union 
challenged the program (Severson, 2004). Warden Cain was warned by other correctional 
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leaders the program would be dangerous. In describing the mindset of the correctional 
community, Cain said, “They told me that one inmate cannot have any power over 
another. Therefore he can’t preach or even lead a Bible study” (Frink, 2002, p. 37). 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary 
at LSP. Specifically, this study was designed to evaluate the program’s affect on the 
moral development of students at LSP. An attempt was made to include a census of all 
students in the LSP Seminary population.  
The evaluation of the Seminary at LSP was important as national policy continued 
to emphasize faith-based initiatives and also led to the United States having the highest 
incarceration rate of any nation in the world (Mauer, 2003). The study of moral 
development was a salient issue for the American public as well (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma 
& Bebeau, 1999). From the frames of higher education, political science and criminal 
justice scholarship, this evaluation may help researchers, administrators, policy makers 
and bureaucrats make more informed and effective decisions. This evaluation may serve 
social scientists and philosophers in terms of advancing their understanding of the social, 
psychological and spiritual development of human beings. 
Despite the relevance of this program to so many fields of scholarship, this 
researcher could not find any previously published studies concerning the Seminary at 
LSP. Searches were conducted through a variety of databases, including Dissertation 
Abstracts, ERIC, Professional Development Collection and Academic Search Premier. 
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Searcy (personal communication, June 25, 2005) confirmed no systematic evaluation had 
been conducted exclusively for the LSP Seminary program. This program evaluation 
stood to fill an important gap in scholarship.  
According to the US Department of Justice, program evaluations could be 
classified as either process-based, or outcomes-based. A process-based evaluation aids 
stakeholders in understanding the program operation for the purpose of replicating the 
program. An outcomes-based evaluation is intended to determine whether the program is 
meeting its goals (U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). An outcomes-based program 
evaluation model was used for this study. 
Primary Research Question 
To what extent do students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral 
judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for 
effective ministry? 
a. What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral 
judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary 
students? 
b. What, if any, statistically significant relationships exist between the moral 
judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types? 
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Methodology 
Population 
During the fall 2005 semester, the LSP Seminary program enrolled 101 students. 
Because the population was relatively small and the measurement instruments allowed 
groups to be evaluated at reasonable costs, the entire program population was invited to 
participate in the study. The DIT and DIT-2 required moderate reading levels (Rest, 
Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). Consequently, the use of a control group was 
determined to be impractical. Appropriate reading levels could not be assured for any 
random group of prisoners outside the college program. 
While an attempt was made to include a census of the population, all participants 
were informed of their rights, including the right to not participate. Particular care was 
taken to practice informed consent consistent with the Common Rule subsection on 
research involving prisoners (45 CFR 46, subpart C). 
In addition to the involvement of the program population, moral judgment data 
were gathered from full-time faculty of NOBTS. The data gathered from the faculty was 
used in conjunction with program population data for the purpose of better addressing the 
Research Question. Faculty data served as a benchmark for student moral development.  
At the time this study began, a census of the 66 full-time faculty members was 
planned, with the actual sample to be dictated by voluntary participation with informed 
consent. Hurricane Katrina, however, caused the evacuation of the NOBTS main campus. 
Most of the faculty who served in administrative roles (e.g., deans) relocated to continue 
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work in Atlanta, GA. The remaining faculty members were dispersed throughout the 
country.  
As a result of the faculty diaspora, a census of faculty was determined to be 
impractical for this evaluation. Consequently, a sample was selected consisting of the 15 
administrative faculty members in Atlanta and 15 randomly selected non-administrative 
faculty members.  
The inclusion of faculty was chosen for three primary reasons. First, the lack of a 
control group limited the conclusions that may have be reached from this study. A 
benchmark group was not the same as a control group but provided some external 
measure. Second, Kohlberg found the moral reasoning of teachers directly impacted the 
moral development of students (Bar-Yam, Kohlberg, & Naame, 1980). An evaluation of 
faculty moral reasoning served to ascertain what level of moral reasoning was consistent 
with the program’s intended outcomes. The third rationale for including faculty followed 
from the second rationale. An evaluation of the moral reasoning of faculty, who 
presumably represented the highest levels of moral reasoning in Baptist theology, served 
as a tool for validating the DIT-2 for this study.  
Instrumentation 
The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® 
(MBTI®) Form F instrument were administered to participants. The DIT-2 (Rest et al., 
1999) was an updated and shortened version of Rest’s (1979a) Defining Issues Test 
(DIT), which was a written assessment based on Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview 
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(MJI) (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Liberman, 1983). The DIT had been used for more 
than two decades, and researchers had accumulated results for more than 500,000 
participants (Rest et al., 1999).  
Form F of the MBTI instrument was the longer research version of the instrument 
and consisted of 166 items. The Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT), 
producer of Form F, authorized that form for external researchers whose research was 
related to concurrent CAPT research plans. This researcher contacted CAPT and was 
approved to use Form F.  
Both the DIT-2 and MBTI measurement tools were based upon extensively 
evaluated theories and had been used for assessments within religious communities, 
correctional systems and college programs (Good & Cartwright, 1998; Griffore & 
Samuels, 1978; King & Mayhew, 2002; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 2003; 
Rest, 1986; Rest et al., 1999; Sandhu, 1997/1998; Watt, Frausin, Dixon & Nimmo, 2000; 
Young, Cashwell & Woolington, 1998). The DIT-2 was considered especially valuable 
for assessing moral development affect in professional educational programs (Rest et al., 
2000). 
Reliability and Validity 
DIT Reliability and Validity 
The evidence for a cognitive theory of moral development was so strong Rest 
(1986) believed, “if a person remains skeptical on the point that there are age trends in 
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moral judgment, it is doubtful that any finding in all of social science will be acceptable” 
(p. 29, 32). One of the fundamental validity traits in Kohlberg’s theory was that 
numerous studies had shown stage-progression is age-related. Similarly, early research of 
the DIT supported its ability to measure moral development as a factor of cognitive 
maturation. According to Rest (1986), “age/education accounts for 30 to 50 percent of the 
variance in DIT scores” (p. 176). So, the general theory of a cognitive basis for moral 
development was well supported. 
Researchers had found the DIT was sufficiently reliable, with reliability 
coefficients usually in the .70s and .80s (Rest et al., 2000). The original version of the 
DIT had an internal reliability, using Chronbach’s alpha, of .76, while the shorter DIT-2 
increased reliability to .81. Combing the DIT and DIT-2 increased reliability to .90, but 
did not yield significantly different results The reliability and validity of the DIT and 
DIT-2 were based upon hundreds of thousands of administrations. The DIT and the DIT-
2 correlated extremely well with each other (Rest et al., 1999). 
The DIT and DIT-2 include several internal methods for protecting reliability and 
validity. For example, DIT score reports include an M score, or Meaningless score.  
A number of meaningless but complex-sounding items are interspersed 
throughout the DIT. If too many of these items receive top ranking by a subject, 
we infer that the subject is not attending to meaning, and consequently invalidate 
that subject’s questionnaire. We also have an internal consistency check in the 
DIT to determine if subjects are randomly responding without attending to any 
item feature. (Rest, 1986, p. 197) 
 
More than 400 studies have been used to validate the DIT in terms of cognitive 
measurement, longitudinal consistency, age and educational discrimination, reliability 
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and other measures of professional ethics and social issues. Still, the developers of the 
DIT sought to gather more data, especially data pertaining to demographic groups most 
salient to the DIT construction and theory. More research was needed into moral 
development in professional education and specific moral dilemmas could be devised to 
measure the moral concerns within various professions (Rest et al., 1999). Because this 
study concerns the professional preparation of clergy, this research provided valuable 
contributions to the research literature.  
According to Rest (1986), a large percentage of studies involving the DIT used 
small sample sizes and have often involved no more than a couple dozen participants 
(Rest, 1986). Literature reviewed for this dissertation included numerous studies with 
small sample sizes. Many of the studies included fewer participants than the number of 
participants who will be invited to participate in this research. Faqua (1983) investigated 
moral judgment among 111 Christian college students. Ang (1989) studied 41 Bible 
college students. Leeland (1990) studied 12 people in an experimental group and 13 
people in a control group. Nelson (2004) used the DIT with a sample of just 56 Bible 
college students. Blizard (1980) investigated differences in moral reasoning among 
members of various denominations. Blizard’s entire sample was comprised of just 115 
church members. Catoe (1992) investigated MBTI and DIT results among 92 college 
students. Watt et al. (2000) included only 22 female prisoners as their primary 
participants. Finally, another study in a prison population included just 30 participants 
(Griffore & Samuels, 1978). 
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Some studies used negligibly larger sample sizes. Washington (1999) used the 
DIT with 149 college students. Warren (1992) included 183 Christian college and high 
school students, as well as 167 public school students. Hoagland (1984) used a sample 
size of 154 in a study comparing conservative Christians with liberal Christians and 
nonreligious participants. A study of Catholics who volunteered to teach religion 
included 224 participants (Walters, 1980). 
This study involved a population of 101 students. The size of the population was 
appropriate for the DIT instrument and was expected to yield reliable and valid statistics. 
Chapter 2 contains a literature review supporting the theoretical validity of the DIT-2 to 
this particular evaluation.  
The DIT has been used with Christian populations in numerous studies. Quite 
often, Christian populations scored at approximately the national average. Many other 
studies have shown Christians to score below average. Christian education programs, 
however, have frequently intended to develop the critical thinking skills consistent with 
the principled reasoning measured by the DIT-2. The DIT-2 was not a perfect measure of 
Christian morality, as it was not designed for Christians, but the DIT-2 did meet the 
validity requirements to serve in this dissertation. Further, the DIT was the most 
appropriate measure available for this research. 
MBTI Reliability and Validity 
The MBTI was a time-tested instrument with high reliability and validity. Internal 
reliability coefficients for middle-aged adults exceeded .90 for each of the 4 dichotomies. 
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Test-retest reliabilities were lower but still ranged from the low .60s to low .80s. The 
psychological nature of the MBTI has caused the instrument to be susceptible to 
variations based upon testing conditions. Further, the certainty of type preference 
identifications has varied with each person and each dichotomy. The lack of certainty has 
caused some individuals to provide different results in test-retest assessments (Myers et 
al., 2003).  
The validity of MBTI assessments has been evaluated by comparison with other 
psychological measures. For example, the MBTI dichotomies have been correlated 
modestly with corresponding dynamics of the 16 Personality Factors Questionnaire, the 
California Psychological Inventory and the Strong Interest Inventory (Myers et al., 2003).  
The MBTI instrument, like the DIT-2, has been theoretically based in an 
assumption of universal applicability. Further, the MBTI instrument could not be used to 
report negative results. No score on an MBTI report could be construed as a bad or poor 
score. All personality type preferences were considered healthy aspects of human 
personality.  
Despite the presumption of all types being equal, there were researchers who 
indicated type differences in moral reasoning. These findings actually supported the 
validity of both the MBTI and the DIT. Type differences in moral reasoning largely fit 
what investigators would have logically concluded based upon type and moral stage 
descriptions.  
The type differences in moral reasoning bore significance on the interpretation of 
results from this study. Prior to the student assessments, the literature supported a 
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hypothesis that Introvert (I), Sensing (S), Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences would 
be overrepresented among LSP Seminary students. The S, F and J preferences were 
predictive of lower moral reasoning scores. The tendency of these types to predict lower 
moral reasoning did not negate the use of the DIT for this population. Instead, 
understanding these types allowed more valid type-appropriate interpretations of DIT 
scores.  
Data Collection 
Students in the LSP Seminary program received letters inviting them to 
participate in this study. The letters provided informed consent and requested their 
signatures indicating whether they agreed or did not agree to be a participant. Those 
students who agreed to participate were asked to complete the MBTI and DIT-2 
instruments in a classroom setting at Angola.  
Research involving prisoners was required to meet the requirements of Common 
Rule subpart C. To ensure LSP Seminary students did not feel any undue pressure to 
participate in this study, those students who attended received informed consent via letter 
and verbally from the researcher just prior to assessment. LSP guards were not in the 
classroom during the research process.  
Each participant received an envelope containing the DIT-2 and the MBTI 
instruments. Each envelope was marked with a particular participant’s name. The 
instruments, however, were only marked with each student’s unique identification 
number created by the researcher for this dissertation. Participants completed the 
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instruments, the DIT-2, the MBTI, and the envelopes were each returned separately to the 
researcher. This method ensured the proper documents were provided to each student, but 
the documents, once completed, could not be identified with the individual student by 
anyone other than the researcher. Once the materials were returned to the researcher, no 
other person at Angola was provided access to the materials.  
The research involving the full-time faculty at the NOBTS main campus was 
conducted in accordance with informed consent. The researcher originally proposed the 
Director of Institutional Research at NOBTS would distribute the informed consent 
letters, the DIT-2, and return envelopes to the faculty members at a regularly scheduled 
faculty meeting. The research plan was changed, however, as a result of Hurricane 
Katrina. The researcher delivered the materials to the offices of 15 NOBTS 
administrators who held faculty ranks and were working in the temporary NOBTS office 
in Atlanta, GA.  
Because the New Orleans campus was closed for the fall 2005 semester and the 
operation of the Seminary was temporarily relocated to Atlanta, the Atlanta offices 
became the main campus. Those 15 faculty members constituted the entire full-time 
faculty at the NOBTS main campus. To increase the number of participants and provide 
data for faculty members not holding administrative roles, another 15 faculty members 
were randomly selected from those dispersed throughout the country. In total, 30 NOBTS 
faculty members were invited to participate. The faculty members were requested to 
complete the DIT-2 and return the instruments by mail to the researcher.  
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Data Analysis 
For Research Question 1a, as to the existence of statistically significant 
differences in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level LSP 
Seminary students, data were analyzed using the DIT-2 P scores, stage scores and 
demographic information. The Center for the Study of Ethical Development provided 
DIT-2 results in an SPSS file. ANOVAs were used to investigate differences in 
dependent variables, which were the respective DIT-2 scores, and the independent 
variable, which was the taxonomy of class-year. Statistical significance was calculated 
based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5%. 
 For Research Question 1b, concerning statistically significant relationships 
between the moral judgment and personality types of LSP Seminary students, data were 
analyzed using the results from the DIT-2 and MBTI instruments. Moral judgment was 
categorized by P scores. Personality type independent variables included each of the 8 
individual dichotomy designations (i.e., I, E, S, N, T, F, J and P), the 16 personality types 
(e.g., INTP), the 4 personality temperaments (i.e., SJ, SP, NT and NF) and Richardson’s 
(1996) 4 spiritualities (i.e., NF, NT, SF and ST). ANOVAs were used to investigate 
differences in the dependent variable, the P score, and the independent variables. 
Statistical significance was calculated based upon a probability of Type I error of less 
than 5%. 
Data analysis for the single Primary Research Question, as to the extent to which 
students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral judgment consistent with program 
goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry, was evaluated 
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with consideration of Research Questions 1a and 1b as well as faculty data. The analysis 
was designed to enhance and expand upon the quantitative data from the preceding 
Research Questions. The quantitative data found in the faculty DIT-2 results was 
synthesized with the findings from previous questions, in an attempt to evaluate the moral 
development of students in the LSP Seminary. The response to the Primary Research 
Question, therefore, presents the primary purpose of this evaluation of a faith-based 
program. 
The research literature relevant to this program evaluation was limited in 
significant areas of content. Little research was available concerning the moral 
development of prisoners or the moral development of seminarians. While questions of 
statistical significance could be determined quantitatively, program success had not been 
defined quantitatively. Therefore, program success could not be fully understood 
quantitatively.  
An evaluation of the program’s effectiveness in facilitating moral development 
necessitated consideration of initial moral judgment and the moral judgment of exiting 
students, as well as the general progress shown across each year of schooling. 
Additionally, an evaluation of the moral development of students included the subjective 
assessment of growth respective of personality. Finally, a program evaluation 
necessitated consideration of what moral judgment was reasonable and appropriate for 
this population. The results of faculty evaluations facilitated creating a benchmark for 
what moral judgments were consistent with the program goals and Baptist theology. 
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Significance of the Study 
There was considerable social and scholarly interest expressed in faith-based 
initiatives, correctional rehabilitation and moral development. This study was intended to 
contribute to a variety of highly salient issues. In particular, this study may serve to 
assist: (a) the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the New Orleans Baptist Theological 
Seminary to improve their program through empirical evaluation, (b) local and federal 
legislators to make better policy decisions about faith-based, correctional and educational 
programs and (c) educators to better understand the moral development of students.  
 A 2005 Congressional hearing was held to investigate the role of faith-based 
initiatives in prison reform, and Angola’s program was a significant topic (“Confronting 
recidivism,” 2005). The Seminary model had recently been expanded to the Mississippi 
State Penitentiary at Parchman, MS. NOBTS had also been in discussion with the states 
of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama, each of which had been considering creating seminary 
programs in their prisons. Moody Bible Institute of Chicago had also been building on 
the NOBTS model and was negotiating with the state of Illinois to begin a college 
program in Illinois prisons (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005). 
An investigation of this program had the potential to contribute tremendously to 
social science and policy. According to Rest (1974), any program that could result in 
even modest moral gains among the “extremely problematic” population of prison 
inmates would be “spectacular” (p. 250). Unfortunately, moral development research 
involving prisoners was quite rare.  
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The need for research-based evidence for education’s impact on prisoner 
development provided reason to investigate the effect education has on Angola inmates. 
According to Everhart (1992), “education is credited with developing one’s ability to 
think to become responsible for individual actions. This last concept is most meaningful 
when dealing with criminal offenders. . . (p. 5).  
The evaluation of this program was also important for the continuing political and 
social discussion of social justice. Faith-based prison reform may be particularly 
promising for the black community, which was dramatically overrepresented among the 
prison population (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005). 
 Evidence of program success may be vital for the long-term growth and support 
of prison education. The federal government cut funding for college education in prisons 
because such funding was deemed a poor use of limited resources. The demonstration of 
program success may be important to the government’s future support for faith-based 
initiatives. Further, evidence of program success may be a step toward changing the 
correctional culture that discourages wardens from pursuing reform.  
The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance implemented the 
Intensive Program Evaluation (IPE) Initiative to gather data on effective efforts to reform 
the criminal justice system (U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997). The Department of 
Justice expected to use research to help bureaucrats make better decisions about justice 
reform. While IPE was specifically charged with gathering and disseminating data 
regarding programs funded by federal grants, this program evaluation was relevant to the 
IPE agenda. 
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One impediment to prison reform had been the system of evaluating prison 
wardens. According to Chaplain Toney, wardens were evaluated based upon the security 
at their prisons rather than rehabilitation outcomes. A warden who prevented riots and 
violence was considered a good warden regardless of the recidivism of released inmates. 
Such a system encouraged wardens to adopt stringent control policies and discouraged 
risk-taking, such as the creation of college programs. A college program relinquished 
some control of prisoners to the college faculty. Additionally, allowing college faculty 
and staff into the prison increased the risk of contraband being smuggled into the prison. 
Under the evaluation system, one warden admitted recidivism was not a warden’s 
concern. “If that prisoner walked out of prison 1 block and raped and murdered 
somebody, that was still OK because they hadn’t done it on his watch” (“Confronting 
recidivism,” 2005, p. 125). 
Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited in several important ways. The DIT-2 was designed to 
assess only moral judgment, which was only one aspect of morality (Bebeau, Rest & 
Narvaez, 1999). For example, the ability to make moral decisions does not necessarily 
predict one will act according to such decisions. Further, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
there was tremendous debate about what it meant to be moral. The DIT was based in one 
particular theoretical system. 
This study’s inclusion of the MBTI assessment was an attempt to understand the 
affect personality may have had on moral development. Chapter 2 includes research 
 22
demonstrating the findings from similar research. It should be noted, however, that many 
other variables not accounted for in this study may have affected moral development. 
Therefore, the results of this study, as all studies, are tentative.  
This study was a one-time, cross-sectional study. More research, such as 
longitudinal studies, would be beneficial in validating or refining the results of this study. 
This evaluation was a beginning evaluation and should serve as an impetus for further 
research. 
Organization of the Study 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 consists of an 
introduction to the study, including the background of the program, purpose of the study, 
and research to be conducted. Chapter 2 details a review of literature pertinent to the 
study. Literature related to moral judgment, education, personality types and theology 
was reviewed. In Chapter 3, the methodology of this study is presented, including the 
Research Questions and conducted statistical measures.  
Chapter 4 presents the analysis of data and results for each of the Research 
Questions. Chapter 5 consists of the conclusions reached based on the present research, a 
synthesis of findings from previous research and this study, as well as delineation of 
unanswered questions and suggestions for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND RELATED RESEARCH 
What is Morality? 
According to Rest (1986), “The function of morality is. . . optimizing mutual 
benefit of people living together in groups” (p. 1). Rest borrowed from Rawls’s (1971) 
statement, “It is morality’s special province…to provide guidelines for determining how 
the benefits and burdens of cooperative living are to be distributed…” (as cited in Rest, 
1986, pp. 1-2). Ethics, which was identified synonymously with morality, consisted of 
two subcategories: meta-ethics and normative ethics. Meta-ethics consisted of the 
philosophical study of ethics or asking questions about ethics. Normative ethics consisted 
of the involvement in ethical conduct or developing policies and principles for ethics 
(Singer, 1994).  
Throughout history, philosophers have debated what constitutes the moral 
decision, how morality may be evaluated, and how morality may be developed among 
people. One of the foremost theories of moral development and measurement is that of 
Kohlberg (1958). Kohlberg (1982) identified his theory as deontological (e.g., Kantian), 
as opposed to teleological (e.g., utilitarian). A deontological ethical system evaluates 
morality based on a presupposition that certain truths exist in the moral realm (e.g., lying 
is wrong). A teleological system bases moral decisions on a presupposition that the 
outcomes are the basis for judgment (Aron, 1977). Kohlberg (1973) traced the 
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development of his own deontological justice orientation through the works of Kant and 
Rawls. 
Kohlberg was a developmental psychologist and formed his theory from the 
scientific, developmental perspective. His system juxtaposed ethical decisions made on 
the basis of rules with decisions based upon principles. According to Singer (1994), 
ethics includes “values” and “rules” (p. 11). Values allow various choices that fall within 
ethical boundaries. Rules are either obeyed or disobeyed. An example of a rule is to not 
kill people. An example of a value is charity. Kohlberg (1981) defined the difference as 
one of options. 
To be honest [is a rule and] means ‘Don’t cheat, don’t steal, don’t lie….’ But 
justice is not a rule…. It is a moral principle. By a moral principle, I mean a mode 
of choosing that is universal…that we want all people to adopt in all situations…. 
There are exceptions to rules, but no exceptions to principles. (p. 39) 
Psychology of Morality 
Piaget 
Piaget was one of the first moral philosophers to work from a scientific 
perspective. In interviewing children about justice, Piaget (1965) found responses fit into 
four categories:  “Behavior that goes against commands received from the adult…. 
Behavior that goes against the rules of the game…. Behavior that goes against 
equality…. Acts of injustice connected with adult society (economic or political 
injustice)” (pp. 313-314).  
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According to Piaget (1965), these four categories create stages of progression 
from infancy through adolescence. The fourth stage moves beyond simple concepts of 
equality of outcomes into the concepts of “equity.” “In the domain of distributive justice 
it means no longer thinking of a law as identical for all but taking account of the personal 
circumstances of each [individual]” (p. 317). “The motto ‘Do as you would be done by,’ 
thus comes to replace the conception of crude equality. The child sets forgiveness above 
revenge, not out of weakness, but because ‘there is no end’ to revenge…” (p. 323). 
Piaget’s (1965) groundbreaking work on the physical, social and psychological 
development of children became a foundation for developmental theories, such as 
Kohlberg’s. Piaget developed a theory that children progress linearly through four stages 
of maturation. Moral development, in particular, was a progressive understanding of 
justice. The first two stages occur in early childhood, until about the age of 7 or 8, at 
which time stage 3 begins. Stage 4 begins in adolescence. 
Kohlberg 
Kohlberg (1966) used interviews of boys to further develop Piaget’s theory. In 
Kohlberg’s theory, people progressed through three major steps, with each step including 
two stages, for a total of six stages. He named the first step preconventional, or premoral. 
The second step was the conventional stage. The final step was postconventional. Each 
step involved a deeper and broader understanding of moral decision-making.  
In various works, Kohlberg defined his theories through different contexts. For 
example, Kohlberg (1973) once used the concept of personal rights to define each moral 
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stage. In another work, Kohlberg’s (1981) moral theory was defined through the rationale 
a person gives for respecting the human rights of other people. In small children, at stage 
1, people had no value for the rights of others. Very young children understood that some 
people were able to make claims on other people because of strength. The stronger 
person could control the weaker person. Power defined all relationships.  
As toddlers, people began to learn forms of manipulation. In stage 2, other people 
were seen as objects to be used for personal gain. Toddlers did not necessarily understand 
the personal needs and desires of parents. What the toddler understood was that certain 
actions can cause the parents to behave in particular ways (Kohlberg, 1981).  
Stage 3 began in middle childhood at a time when social relationships were 
paramount. Human rights, therefore, became an issue of maintaining close social 
relationships. Children did not want to hurt other people because such actions cause pain, 
embarrassment and isolation. Most adults could be classified as either stage 3 or stage 4 
(Kohlberg, 1981).  
People in stage 4 have moved beyond merely thinking only of individual 
relationships and have begun making moral decisions with consideration toward society, 
as a whole. According to Kohlberg (1981), for the stage 4 thinker, “life is conceived as 
sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties” 
(pp. 19-20). Kohlberg’s stage 4 included moral decisions made through the confines of 
any system of social order, whether government law, or religious law. The key to this 
level was the subjection of individuals to the established order.  
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Kohberg (1981) and Kohlberg and Ryncarz (1990), considered most Christians to 
exist at stage 4, and in fact, considered Christianity to be a stage 4 system. To describe 
human life as valuable because people are created in God’s image was stage 4 thinking 
because the value relies on an external legitimacy. Even though such a view was 
universal, the reliance on God’s decree made the philosophy a law and order philosophy 
(Kohlberg, 1981). 
The postconventional stages included stages 5 and 6. These stages were abstract 
in nature, and most adults were not abstract moral thinkers. In stage 5, “life is valued both 
in terms of its relation to community welfare and in terms of life being a universal human 
right.” Stage 5 moral philosophies included social contract theories and utilitarianism. In 
stage 6, “human life is sacred—a universal human value of respect for the individual” 
(Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 19-20). 
Stage 5 was abstract in its definition of universal human rights. Like stage 4, the 
value of humanity was somewhat arbitrary. Laws were different from one country to 
another. Therefore, stage 4 was based on an arbitrary value. Social contracts differ across 
time and place, and utilitarian ethics differ with each situation. The universal aspect of 
stage 5 rested in the determination that social contracts and utilitarianism were impartial 
systems. Under a social contract, laws were applied to everyone equally (Locke, 
2000/1690). In a utilitarian system, each person’s worth was no greater or less than any 
other person’s worth (Mill, 2002/1861). 
Kohlberg believed stage 6 was the highest level of moral development. In stage 6 
thinking, “the worth of the individual human being is central where the principles of 
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justice and love are normative for all human relationships…. Stage 6 people answer in 
moral words such as duty and morally right and use them in a way implying universality, 
ideals and impersonality” (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 22). In other words, stage 6 thinkers had 
moved beyond the self-centered concerns of children, the social order focus of the 
legalists, and the arbitrary decisions of social contract theorists and utilitarians. The stage 
6 thinker had expanded the universal aspects of stage 5 from universal within current 
society to universal across time and place. The stage 6 thinker was committed to 
universal application of principles. 
The scientific approach Kohlberg (1981) used to assess moral development was 
based largely on Piaget. His work was not solely based in biological development, 
however. He was significantly influenced by philosophical thinkers, such as Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Rawls, and Dewey. It was through such philosophy that Kohlberg 
came to focus his research and his theory on the concept of justice. “I cannot define 
moral virtue at the individual level, [so] I have tried it at the social level and found it to 
be justice…” (p. 39). 
Kohlberg’s (1958) theory was developed from interviews he conducted for his 
doctoral dissertation. He eventually developed the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), 
which was a structured interview, conducted by trained interviewers (Colby et al., 1983). 
Each participant was asked a series of moral dilemmas, such as the famous Heinz 
dilemma. The Heinz dilemma asked what action a man should take when his wife is 
dying of a curable disease, but the man cannot afford the medicine. 
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The responses participants provided for moral dilemma questions were scored by 
comparing them to the types of responses characteristic of each moral stage. The MJI 
required significant time by researchers. Each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
Additional time was required for interpretation (Colby et al., 1983; Kohlberg, 1981).  
The Defining Issues Test was development by Rest (1979a) as an adequate 
substitute for the MJI because the resource requirements of the MJI were so significant. 
While the DIT was initially intended to be an adequate substitute for the MJI, Rest and 
his colleagues refined the DIT and its theoretical basis to the point where they deemed 
the DIT to be superior the MJI (Bebeau & Thoma., 1999 May; Narvaez, Bebeau, Thoma, 
& Rest, 1999; Rest et al., 2000; Rest et al., 1999).  
Philosophy of Morality 
Kant 
Many moral philosophers would divide the world into the time before Kant, and 
the time since Kant (Ferre, 1951). Kant’s system of ethics (1994b) was a major work of 
the Rationalist era. He based his work on presuppositions of human rationality, 
impartiality and goodness. The philosophy that dominated Western liberalism before 
Kant was natural law theory. Kant differed from the natural law theorists in that he 
believed in an innate goodness of people, which allows people to independently pursue 
and reach the truth (Schneewind, 1992). 
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Kant’s view of society was influenced by Rousseau’s (1988/1762) social contract 
theory, in which independent people willingly surrender some freedom to enter into a 
society that promotes justice through unanimously agreed upon obligations (Schneewind, 
1992). Kant further developed Rousseau’s theory by claiming the social contract would 
be based on universal principles of justice, not the majority opinion. 
“Categorical imperatives” were to form the basis for universal ethical laws, 
according to Kant (1994b). Categorical imperatives were those obligations rational 
people would want to be universally applied. “Act only according to that maxim by 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law,” Kant wrote 
(p. 274). According to Kant, those who would consider suicide or living off welfare 
should consider the ramification if everyone committed suicide or became social 
parasites. Neither choice is ethical since it stands to reason universal application of such 
choices would lead to society’s destruction. 
Honesty was a moral obligation, according to Kant (1994b). If telling the truth 
results in another person’s harm, the speaker has no fault, for he or she merely conveyed 
the truth. Kant used the example of a murderer who asks for information concerning his 
victim. Providing information does not necessarily involve the speaker in the crime. A 
speaker who lies, however, bears criminal culpability for any resulting harm, even if the 
lie was told with sincere intentions of protecting the victim. “To be truthful (honest) in all 
declaration, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited 
by no expediency” (Kant, 1994a, p. 281). Kohlberg’s (1981) claim there are “no 
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exceptions to principles” was an echo of Kant’s statement the principle of truth is 
“limited by no expediency.” 
A “practical imperative,” in addition to the categorical imperative, was argued for 
by Kant (1994b). “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that 
of another, always as an end and never as a means only” (p. 279). This view was similar 
to the Golden Rule (Kohlberg, 1982). The moral foundation for both Kant and Kohlberg 
was a principled belief that humans have innate worth.  
In Kantian ethics, moral action is inspired by one’s own rational morality, without 
regard to external rewards or punishments (Schneewind, 1992). According to Kant 
(1994b), any act motivated by hope of a reward fails to be moral because of its selfish 
motive. Ferre (1951), however, contends Kant, and numerous subsequent ethicists, have 
defined morality and justice too narrowly. While narrow definition of a field is required 
for modern academic scholarship, the practical effect is that ethicists have ignored the 
contributions of the other fields offering insight into their work. Kant’s views on reward, 
for example, have no place for many insights of behavioral and social psychology. 
Kant considered religious faith to be important to moral development, but he 
conceived of religion in a transcendental and agnostic fashion. Kant insisted he, himself, 
was religious and that religion was indispensable to society. His religion, however, was 
similar to his politics. Both religion and politics, in Kant’s mind, were constructs 
intended to foster individual development. Because development could only come 
through reason, both institutions were to be ultimately focused on reason (Wood, 1992). 
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The philosophy of Kant was based in human rationalism and personal autonomy. 
Kant viewed acceptance of the divine will to be “heteronomy,” not autonomy 
(Schneewind, 1992, p. 316). Heteronomy was an individual’s subjection of his or her 
own reason to externally created judgments. Autonomy was to use one’s own reason for 
making judgments.  
An individual’s obligation to others is a central feature of Kant’s philosophy. 
Kant viewed charity as, at best, a necessary evil. He thought anyone who depended on 
charity was a slave to the good will of the charitable giver. For this reason, Kant viewed 
the concept of obligation as superior to charity. Only when one could demand specific 
action from others could one be free from the whims of others (Schneewind, 1992). This 
view is in significant contrast to the Christian theology of charity as a social good. 
Mutual obligation, in which one person may demand something from another, is not a 
significant feature of Christian theology. One may feel obligation to provide care to 
another, but not necessarily to demand care be given by another person for one’s self.  
As Singer (1994) noted: 
Kant’s assertion that the moral law is a law of reason was based on his own 
peculiar metaphysics. He saw human nature as eternally divided. On one side is 
our natural or physical self, trapped in the world of desires. On the other is our 
intellectual or spiritual self, which partakes of the world of reason from which the 
moral law derives. (p. 8)  
Rawls 
Kohlberg (1973) argued Rawls’s theory of justice was more articulate and 
developed than even that of Kant, and was quite superior to social contract theories. 
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Rawls (1957) was concerned with justice in institutions and not justice as individual 
moral action. That macro focus was similar to Kohlberg’s assertion that he could not 
define individual moral action, but concluded justice is the hallmark of the moral system.  
The theory of justice proposed by Rawls (1957) began on the premise all citizens 
were entitled to the maximum freedom that did not hinder the freedom of others, and any 
limitations on freedom must have had a utilitarian effect of maximizing the common 
good. Justice was defined in a legal sense. “Justice is the elimination of arbitrary 
distinctions and the establishment…of a proper balance between competing claims (p. 
653). 
Individual freedom was viewed by Rawls (1971) as always the servant of the 
social structure. Whereas a libertarian viewed a worker’s wages as the private contract 
between worker and employer, Rawls viewed wages as a systematic tool of social 
engineering. “An inequality [of pay] is allowed only if there is reason to believe that the 
practice with the inequality will work to the advantage of every party” (p. 654).  
As a 20th century liberal, Rawls (1957) viewed equality and freedom in economic 
terms. He assumed any group creating a society would be a collection of rent-seeking 
factions, each trying to establish their own benefit. The result would be a moral, 
socialized system, in which equality is artificially created.  
Kohlberg (1973) specifically identified Rawls’s (1971) model of justice as the 
epitome of moral reasoning. Kohlberg made the caveat, however, that Rawls’s social 
model was not necessarily the only social model, because principles can be applied in 
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different manners. Still, Kohlberg considered Rawls’s theory of justice to be the most 
clearly and uniformly stage 6 moral system.  
Rawls (1971) outlined one of the most significant rationales for modern liberal 
political theory. Under his system, social systems were to be evaluated through concepts 
of a veil of ignorance and a view from what he called the original position. His theory 
asked evaluators to imagine being placed in the original position, which is a pre-mortal 
state. Evaluators were given a certain amount of knowledge about societies; the 
knowledge, however, was limited by the veil of ignorance. The evaluators were told 
facts, such as the range of incomes within each society. The evaluators were not told, 
however, the percentiles of income distributions.  
From the limited vantage point of the original position, the evaluators were to 
choose the society in which they would like to be born. The evaluators would not know 
whether they would be born rich or poor, male or female, healthy or sick, etc. Rawls’s 
presumption was that people will assume the vantage point of the lowliest people in 
society, because they assume a significant chance exists they will be born in the worst 
circumstances. Such evaluators would choose the society that offers the most justice (i.e., 
security) for the meek. In other words, a socialized nation would be preferable to a more 
merit-oriented society.  
Kohlberg (1973) believed a great quality of Rawls’s original position/veil of 
ignorance was its applicability to both macro and micro-morality. He believed the system 
could be used to solve personal problems such as real life dilemmas as well as social 
issues such as social construction. One could use the system to decide whether to 
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personally give to charity, and whether to vote for universal healthcare, by asking the 
same question. The question to ask was what decision would make one more likely to 
choose that society from the vantage point of the original position. 
A common criticism of Rawls’s theory was the requirement that certain 
knowledge be available, while other knowledge was denied, to the decision maker. 
Kohlberg (1973) conceded the veil of ignorance required ignorance of certain 
probabilities, while requiring knowledge of other probabilities. He considered the ignored 
probabilities to be “morally irrelevant,” however (p. 644). In fact, Kohlberg (1973) 
contended the selectively available information actually precludes non-moral issues, such 
as self-interest, from entering into the decision. It is the intentionally limited information, 
Kohlberg (1973) believed, that forced the issue to be entirely based on moral judgment.  
Kohlberg 
Justice was the epitome of moral reasoning, according to Kohlberg (1981). His 
early work was based largely on the philosophical work of Kant and Rawls (Kohlberg & 
Power, 1981). Kohlberg (1981) noted empirical studies were unable to identify stage 6 
thinkers. Kohlberg’s progressive model of stages 1 through 5 was developed by analysis 
of interviews. His stage 6 conception, however, was a theoretical derivative of liberal 
philosophy.  
The development of justice reasoning was vital to the creation of a morally 
sufficient humanity, Kohlberg (1981) contended. Conventional reasoning was what led so 
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many Nazis to engage in horrendous acts. The Nazi excuse of following orders is a stage 
4 rationale, which appeals to law (Kohlberg, 1966).  
Religion was placed in stage 4 by Kohlberg (1966). His example of stage 4 
religious rationalizing was an interviewee who said, “The doctor wouldn’t have the right 
to take life, no human has the right. He can’t create life, he shouldn’t destroy it.” Yet, 
Kohlberg also allowed a transcendent religiosity in stage 6.  
By the law of society [the husband] was wrong but by the law of nature or of God 
the druggist was wrong and the husband was justified. Human life is above 
financial gain. Regardless of who was dying, if it was a total stranger, man has a 
duty to save him from dying. (p. 9)  
 
So, while Kohlberg generally placed any appeal to religious law as stage 4 reasoning, 
such appeals could be stage 6 if they appealed to universal principles. To say, “God 
requires” was stage 4. To say, “justice requires” was stage 6. “Thus saith the Lord” was 
stage 4, while “Thus saith wisdom” was stage 6. Kohlberg’s interview format hinged on 
such semantics. 
Stage 6 thinking was “to learn to make decisions of principle; it is to learn to use 
‘ought’ sentences verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have 
by our own decision accepted and made our own” (Kohlberg, 1966 p. 22). 
Principled Reasoning 
Kohlberg (1973), in part, validated his theory by noting that every philosopher 
interviewed in his research reasoned at either stage 5 or stage 6, which are known as the 
post-conventional, or principled stages. He contended stage 6 is more developed, but he 
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did not adequately explain why many philosophers, educated in Kantian ethics, still chose 
stage 5. Aron (1977) noted that many of the most significant philosophies (e.g., social 
contract theory and utilitarianism) are more linked to stage 5 thinking than stage 6 
thinking. Baier (1973), likewise, believed Kohlberg had failed to adequately differentiate 
stages 5 and 6. Kohlberg (1982) admitted, himself, to significant difficulty in definitively 
differentiating stages 5 and 6. 
The concept of reversibility came to be the keystone of stage 6 thinking 
(Kohlberg, 1973). Reversibility exists when an actor would make the same decision if he 
or she were in the original position, a state in which the actor knows he or she will be in 
the situation, but not at which social post. For example, in Kohlberg’s Heinz dilemma 
(Colby et al., 1983), an actor in the original position would know he or she would end up 
being Heinz, the wife or the druggist, but not know in which position he or she would be 
placed. In such an original state, under the veil of ignorance, the moral decision would be 
made because the actor would choose the decision best for the least benefited member of 
the group. Reversibility is the foundation of Rawlsian justice (1971) because in Rawls’s 
system, a just outcome is that in which any member of society could be placed in the least 
benefited position and not feel mistreated.  
Reversibility is seen as differentiating stage 6 from stage 5 because Kohlberg 
concluded many stage 5 theories (e.g., social contract) do not meet the standards of 
reversibility. For example, Adam Smith’s (2003/1776) capitalism postulates universal 
principles of property rights. Smith believed property rights are universal principles and 
not based upon an arbitrary social contract. Smith’s philosophy fails the stage 6 test of 
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reversibility, however. From an original position, many people would not choose a 
system that places them at the mercy of their own productivity. The 20th century move 
toward socialism was evidence of the irreversibility of capitalism. Again, Kohlberg 
(1981) and Rawls (1971) treated economic justice (i.e., security) as a keystone of socio-
moral principles.  
In stages 5 and 6, rights are common to all people, at least within the society, and 
each member of society is expected to defend the rights of all others. A difference 
between stages 5 and 6, however, is that in stage 5, rights are usually only those 
acknowledged by the social contract, while in stage 6, rights are universal and impose 
demands regardless of social acknowledgment (Kohlberg, 1973). 
Kohlberg and Religion 
According to Kohlberg (1982), the Christian concept of “Love your neighbor” 
was just as legalistic as “Do not kill” and “Do not steal.” He classified all three biblical 
standards as moral rules. In contrast, Kohlberg stated the biblical standard of “the golden 
rule” was as principled as Kantian and Rawlsian ethics. In Kohlberg’s view, the 
distinction was that rules prescribed “actions,” whereas principles provided “a method for 
making a choice” (p. 520).  
Like Kant, Kohlberg (1981) treated religion as a social construct, which required 
the presupposition that religion was not true. Religion, then, was an arbitrary force of 
social formation; religion was an aspect of culture, like dress, language, and cuisine. This 
view led Kohlberg to the unavoidable claim that religion was independent of moral 
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development. He frequently referred to literature supporting his claim. In his later work, 
however, he came to include religion as a feature of moral development; still, he never 
came to view religion as more than supportive of morality (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). In 
fact, Kohlberg (1981) explicitly claimed religious education was almost worthless for 
moral development. 
Alternative Views 
 The moral development model of Kohlberg was frequently criticized from a 
variety of perspectives. Some researches, such as Gilligan (1993), contested the 
interpretation of Kohlberg’s research. Other writers, such as Bennett (1995), contested 
the philosophical bases for his theory.  
Flanagan and Jackson (1987) criticized Kohlberg’s theory as being too narrowly 
focused on the singular concept of justice. Some scholars (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; 
Snarey, 1985) criticized Kohlberg’s theory as being exclusive to liberal, Western 
concepts of individuality and justice. Joy (1986) criticized Kohlberg’s notion of justice as 
too narrowly defined. While Kohlberg claimed to base his research in Piaget’s concept of 
moral justice, Joy believed Piaget’s justice was broader and more aligned with Judeo-
Christian justice. Kohlberg was led, according to Joy, by “his own political biases…into 
obvious distortion of ‘what is moral’” (p. 406).  
Moral development was viewed by Hogan (1973) as a combination of social 
relationships and personal autonomy. During the course of his career, Kohlberg slowly 
evolved to allow more influence from culture and society. His early work was so based in 
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Kantian ethics that any reference to a social norm was considered conventional thinking 
(Kohlberg, 1967). His later work still emphasized individual autonomy, but began to 
allow that some moral principles could be influenced, or at least encouraged, by social 
morals (Kohlberg & Powers, 1981).  
Kohlberg’s inconsistency across time was a criticism of Reed (1997). According 
to Reed, Kohlberg’s theory was based on a rationalist concept of self-created ethics. 
Kohlberg’s Just Community pedagogy, however, relied on socially and democratically 
created ethics, as well as social norms and pressures to encourage adherence to principled 
morality.  
The community, according to Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Powers, 1981), was an agent 
for supporting or inhibiting moral principles, rather than teaching moral principles. It was 
the supportive function, rather than instructive function, of the community Kohlberg 
(1981) insisted prevented moral judgment from being externally oriented. For many 
scholars, such as Reed (1997), the distinction was a semantic argument with little 
practical significance.  
One of the most influential critics of Kohlberg was Gilligan. She argued 
Kohlberg’s justice ethic was too narrowly focused and biased against care, which she 
contended, was the dominant ethic for women (1993/1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). 
Rest (1986), however, claimed Gilligan’s work was unsupported by the vast majority of 
research. According to Rest: 
[Gilligan] did not actually do a systematic review of the moral judgment literature 
on sex differences before making the bold statement that justice-oriented scoring 
systems downgrade women…. Systematic reviews are now available….and the 
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results are unambiguous: it is a myth that males score higher on Kohlberg’s test 
than females (p. 112) 
 
Researchers using the DIT have also failed to replicate Gilligan’s claim (Aronovitz, 
1984; Denny, 1988; Taylor, 1992; Wahrman, 1980; Watt et al., 2000; Wright, 2001;). 
The evidence for the gender neutrality and other aspects of validity of the Kohlberg 
model is evaluated later in this chapter.  
Gilligan proposed care and justice orientations were not overarching moral 
frameworks. Rest (1986), however, asserted Gilligan’s modified theory lacked support. 
“Although the care orientation is said to be an alternative and parallel path of moral 
development, there is not one longitudinal study or any cross-sectional data to support 
that claim” (p. 117).  
Despite growing evidence against Gilligan’s work, she was influential in the field 
of moral development theory. Kohlberg (1982) admitted Gilligan’s work was a useful 
hypothesis, especially in its early phases, and helped him refine his own interpretations of 
interviews. In the long-term, however, Gilligan’s work was not validated. 
In general, researchers found no gender differences on Kohlberg’s moral 
dilemmas. Women, however, were more likely to use care orientations when responding 
to a dilemma concerning surrogate parents. The emphasis on care among women was 
even greater among women in prison (Watt et al., 2000). This might have been an 
indication the care orientation was a lesser rationale and surfaced more when dilemmas 
elicited affective bias. 
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A pragmatic criticism of Kohlberg’s stage 6 was offered by Henson (1973). The 
Kantian assertion that obligation is greater than charity is an integral part of stage 6. 
Hogan believed the moral claims of stage 6 reasoning were ill-defined because Kohlberg 
did not establish how one could determine which claims of a person were justifiably 
binding on others and which claims were ignorable self-interests.   
Kohlberg’s theory was criticized by Clouse (1985) who argued the conventional 
reasoning of stage 4 thinkers could actually be a healthy for society in balancing the 
change orientation and social upheaval of liberals. Clouse’s work specifically addressed 
the Kohlberg’s (1966) frequent assertion conservatives, whether religious or political, 
were less moral than liberals and posed the danger of Nazism.  
Much of the debate concerning moral reasoning was a matter of defining what it 
meant to be moral and what caused or inhibited moral development. Early Greek 
philosophers, such as Aristotle and Socrates, disagreed with each other; Kant disagreed 
with the natural law theorists. There was no consensus in moral philosophy and the 
historical development of moral philosophy was rich and contentious. 
Fowler 
Fowler worked in conjunction with Kohlberg, but he conducted his research with 
a focus on the development of religious faith. Fowler believed faith was a prerequisite for 
stage 6 thinking because people needed some source for idealizing. According to Fowler, 
Kant and Kohlberg appealed to faith in their own abilities, whereas Christians appealed to 
faith in their theology (Wallwork, 1980). Wallwork, however, did not like Fowler’s broad 
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definition of faith because it allowed for almost any belief not based in objective science 
to be faith. 
Fowler modified Kohlberg’s theory, based on the insistence morality and religion 
were incongruent, to combine religious faith development and moral development into 
parallel constructs (Wallwork, 1980). Fowler defined principled faith as deriving 
authority from “reflective” thought (Kohlberg & Power, 1981, p. 334).  
Kohlberg generally viewed Christianity to be a blind, obedient faith. Hoge et al. 
(1982), however, claimed Baptists emphasize reflective thinking about their theology. 
Baptist theology, then, is consistent with the development of mature faith, and hence 
mature moral judgment. Grimley (1991) argued Kohlberg’s stage 6 is contingent upon a 
developed religious belief. Further, Grimley found a relatively strong correlation of 0.75 
between stage development in the DIT and Fowler’s stages of faith development.  
Other Research Instruments 
Although this literature review focused on the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a 
review of other measurement instruments was conducted. There were numerous 
instruments available. The DIT was the most common, however, and was determined to 
be most appropriate for this research. 
The Moral Justification Scale (MJS) was a paper and pencil test structured 
similarly to the DIT. The MJS, however, was designed to categorize participants 
according to justice or care moral orientations (Gump, Baker & Roll, 2000). As discussed 
earlier, the care framework was useful as a supplemental consideration, but was not 
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supported as an overarching theory. As an instrument, the MJS has a mediocre reliability 
of .64 on the justice orientation and .75 on the care orientation (Gump et al., 2000). 
Reliability of the MJS was considerably lower than the DIT (Rest et al., 2000). 
An excellent collection of instruments, and analyses of their uses, reliability and 
validity, may be found in Hill and Hood’s Measures of religiosity (1999). Their 
collection included instruments for a variety of religious issues, such as faith, morality, 
commitment, and fundamentalism. Most instruments, particularly those of moral 
reasoning, have low reliability, in comparison to the DIT, and were not determined to 
have validity for this study.  
Defining Issues Test 
About the Defining Issues Test 
 The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was created by Rest as a substitute for the Moral 
Judgment Interview (MJI). The DIT was a written test presenting six moral dilemmas. 
Participants read each dilemma and then read twelve rationales for how to respond to the 
dilemma. The participant was asked to evaluate the relevance of each rationale and 
choose which rationales were most relevant. The various rationales were designed to 
represent varying stages of moral judgment. The DIT had several inherent and obvious 
advantages over the MJI. The advantages include the ability to evaluate more 
participants, increased reliability across evaluations, and reduced costs (Rest et al., 1999).  
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The test was a paper-and-pencil test, which meant it could be administered to 
groups of people at one time. The MJI, on the other hand, required individual interviews 
with each participant. The administration of the DIT allows the evaluation of much larger 
samples (Rest et al., 1999).  
The MJI required interviewers to be trained for the structured interview. 
Additionally, significant training was required for the evaluation and scoring of interview 
data. Every response given by a participant required evaluation for its fit with the moral 
stages. While the structure of the MJI allowed reasonable inter-rater reliability, the 
evaluations were still subject to human error. The DIT, on the other hand, was objectively 
scored. DITs could be scored via a scoring rubric or computer scored by the Center for 
the Study of Ethical Development, publisher of the DIT (Rest et al., 1999). 
Substantial cost benefits were available to researchers using the DIT compared 
with those researchers using the MJI. The ability to administer to larger samples, and do 
so quickly, as well as score the results quickly, saved time and money. Evaluations of 
large programs could be conducted with much greater efficiency using the DIT (Rest et 
al., 1999).  
After more than two decades in use, the DIT was recently revised. The new 
instrument was known as the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2). The new instrument was 
shortened to include only five dilemmas. Dilemmas were updated as needed. 
Additionally, a new statistic was created for the DIT-2 (Rest et al., 1999).  
 46
Four-Component Model 
The theoretical basis for the DIT involved the Four-Component Model (Narvaez 
et al., 1999; Rest et al., 2000). The Four-Component Model divided morality into four 
categories: moral attention, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral virtue. Moral 
attention was the ability to recognize moral situations. A sociopath, for example, lacks 
moral attention. Moral judgment was the ability to choose the moral action that should be 
taken by an actor. Moral motivation was the internal desire to act according to moral 
standards. Finally, moral virtue was the personal determination to act morally, even when 
it would be most convenient to act immorally.  
The DIT was designed to measure moral judgment, the second of the four 
components. Moral judgment requires moral attention, the first component. When 
someone is faced with a moral dilemma, such as provided in the MJI or the DIT, that 
person must recognize the moral features of the dilemma in order to provide a moral 
judgment. The DIT’s focus on component two meant its results do not fully indicate a 
person’s morality. For example, the DIT was not intended to predict what a person would 
do in a situation. The DIT merely measured what a person thought should be done in that 
situation (Rest, 1986). The DIT’s construction was aligned with Kohlberg’s view that 
moral judgment is a matter of what one ‘ought’ to do in the situation. 
Rest and Moral Theory 
Rest substantially refined Kohlberg’s moral development theory, creating what he 
called the neo-Kohlbergian model. One change in the neo-Kohlbergian model was 
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Kohlberg’s stages were refined into schemas. Specifically, Kohlberg’s stage model was 
based on the insistence that every individual exists in a particular stage. Evolution from 
one stage to another was a punctuated action in which a person clearly changed from the 
lower stage to the higher stage. Like Kohlberg’s stages, Rest’s schemas followed the 
progressive, developmental pattern, and were also based on developmental psychology. 
Rest’s schemas, however, allowed a more gradual transition across the range of moral 
development. In the newer model, the schemas were as follows: (a) Personal Interest 
(labeled S23), which correlates to Kohlberg’s stages 2 and 3; (b) Maintaining Norms 
(S4), which correlates to stage 4; and (c) Postconventional (S56), which correlated to 
stages 5 and 6 (Narvaez et al., 1999; Rest, 1986). 
The Four-Component Model was created by Rest (1986) to describe the process 
of moral action. The model consists of (a) rational decision-making, (b) moral evaluation, 
(c) moral choice, and (d) moral fortitude. According to Rest, this model was based upon 
“processes” and not “virtues” or personal “traits” (p. 5). Additionally, the cognitive 
process involved interplay of the components rather than stage procession.  
The DIT is based on the premise that people at different points of development 
interpret moral dilemmas differently, and have different intuitions about what is 
right and fair in a situation…. These [intuitions] are not necessarily apparent to a 
subject as articulative rule systems or verbalizable philosophies—rather, they may 
work ‘behind the scenes’ and may seem to a subject as just commonsensical and 
intuitively obvious. (Rest, 1986, p. 196)  
 
The behind the scenes function of the moral schemas was considerably different 
than Kohlberg’s theory. In the MJI, interviewees were only scored according to the level 
they could clearly explain. It was not enough for an interviewee to say Heinz should do 
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some action. The interviewee must also have explained why that action was the moral 
choice. The expository requirement of the MJI required individuals to have a firmly 
established moral system in their own minds. The DIT, however, asked respondents to 
choose the most moral action. Respondents did not need to explain why that action was 
moral (Narvaez et al., 1999). 
Respondents often scored higher on the DIT than the MJI. According to Rest 
(1986), the format of the instrument caused the difference in the scores. “Since subjects 
usually find recognition tasks (like the DIT) easier than production tasks (like the 
Kohlberg task), it is not too surprising that the DIT credits subjects with more advanced 
thinking than does the Kohlberg test” (Rest, 1986, p. 197). The DIT, in this view, was 
more valid in measuring moral judgment, because it was measuring cognition rather than 
verbalization. 
The basic philosophical foundation for Rest’s theory was very similar to 
Kohlberg’s philosophy. According to Rest (1986), a concept of “fairness” was inherent in 
the mental paradigms of individuals, although the definition of fairness was relative to the 
individual’s level of cognitive moral development (p. 10). For example, in stage 2, Rest 
(1986) described fairness as, “direct exchange of favor for favor” (p. 10). Stage 3 entailed 
a fairness of “maintaining positive, long-term relationships…that I know I can count on 
you and that you can count on me….” (p. 10). Fairness in stage 4 was defined in terms of 
the solidarity of the greater society which relied on the general willingness of people to 
submit to the law.  
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Individuals automatically used their personal definition of fairness when making 
moral choices. Rest (1986) used the Heinz dilemma to illustrate the interaction of 
“fairness” in moral decision-making. According to Rest, someone at stage 4 would 
consider the possibility of Heinz stealing in terms of what social consequences might 
result from theft. A person at stage 4 might ask what would happen if everyone chose to 
steal when they were in need. The stage 4 thinker might conclude that while Heinz’s wife 
should not needlessly die, rampant theft could damage society.  
One variation Rest (1986) made to Kohlberg’s theory was an allowance for 
greater social construction of moral principles. While Kohlberg gradually incorporated 
greater acceptance of social power, such as the Just Community pedagogy, his foundation 
in Kant always made him leery of groupthink. Kohlberg had referenced the Nazis as an 
example of the danger in following society.  
Rest disagreed with Kohlberg’s comparison of law and order with Nazi  
culpability. Rest believed the key to developmentally valuable social norms was a society 
open to discussion and the free exchange of ideas. Rest wrote: 
Morality that is relative to group deliberation is not tantamount to the mindless 
moral relativism or moral skepticism that Kohlberg feared, nor does it pave the 
way to Nazi atrocities. Common morality might be different for different 
communities (and therefore relative), but the common morality is debated and 
scrutinized by members of the community and reflects an equilibrium between the 
ideals and the moral intrusions of the community. (Rest et al., 2000, p. 385) 
 
Morally productive societies do not merely prescribe law, but debate law and evolve law. 
The theoretical foundation of Rest’s theory and the DIT were validated by researchers 
who have investigated correlations between P scores and corresponding social principles. 
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If the DIT accurately measured one’s understanding of abstract human values, such as the 
rights to life, free expression and liberty, then the DIT should correlate reasonably well 
with instruments that specifically measure attitudes toward those issues.  
Getz (1985) found participants with high levels of principled moral reasoning 
were moral likely to score high on a measure of support for controversial human rights 
issues, lending support for the idea that moral reasoning scores indicate a factor in one’s 
social thought. Similarly, Blizard (1980) found a significant relationship between moral 
reasoning (DIT) and one’s commitment to humanitarianism.  
DIT and Colleges Students 
The DIT has been used in thousands of studies involving college students. 
According to Rest’s (1986) review of education program evaluation literature, “the 
overall power of moral education programs taken together without regard to type of 
program is statistically significant, but is, according to Cohen, in the small range” (p. 79). 
In that analysis, Rest considered programs that were specifically aimed at moral 
development and measured using the DIT. Consequently, his programs were all one 
semester or less, usually much less, in length. Rest focused his review on such short 
programs to provide a reasonable limit to his research.  
The program being evaluated in this dissertation was an entire college curriculum. 
Rest (1986) described four general types of educational programs evaluated for moral 
judgment effect They are (a) “moral dilemma” discussions, (b) “personality 
development,” (c) traditional academic programs not directly teaching moral judgment, 
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and (d) “short-term” programs (p. 80). Rest  (1986) found moral dilemma and personality 
development programs analyzed using this method yielded small effect sizes, while 
academic and short-term programs had no effect. Because Rest  (1986) focused on 
literature concerning targeted moral education programs, he limited his review of 
literature regarding entire four-year college programs. There was a plethora of literature 
available, however, on college evaluations using the DIT. Some of that research was 
briefly addressed by Rest (1986). 
Educational program literature was evaluated by Rest (1986) who found college 
students generally showed small gains (average effect size of .28) from moral 
development programs. In one study of a two year nursing program, students did not 
show any advance in moral reasoning (Aronovitz, 1984). One excellent literature review 
concerning the DIT and college education, overall, was conducted by Pascarella and 
Terenzini (1991). They concluded college programs were substantially related to 
increases in levels of moral reasoning. Overall, education accounted for approximately 
half of the variance in moral judgment scores (Bebeau et al.; 1999; Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 1991; Rest, 1986). 
DIT and Christians 
 The program evaluated in this dissertation was a distinctively Christian college 
program. The DIT has been used extensively for studies of Christian populations, in both 
educational and noneducational contexts. While the DIT was generally accepted as a 
valid instrument for moral evaluation in secular settings, there were some researchers 
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who doubted its validity for Christian populations. In Chapter 3, the validity of the DIT 
for this program is elaborated in detail. This section provides a general review of 
literature concerning Christians. 
 Religion was irrelevant to moral development, according to Kohlberg (1981). In 
fact, he claimed his theory was universally applicable to all populations. A number of 
critics, however, questioned his claims. Rest (1986) analyzed 24 studies concerning 
Christians and found Christians usually scored slightly below average, or at the average. 
He concluded the literature generally supports the use of the DIT with Christian 
populations.  
The difficulty in reviewing literature concerning Christians is differentiating 
research by definitions of Christianity. Some researchers categorized Christians by self-
identification. Some researchers categorized Christians through church membership or 
religious activity. Other researchers categorized Christians through the use of measures of 
religiosity. 
 Some researchers have not found religiosity to be a significant factor in moral 
development. Wahrman (1981) studied college students of various religions and found 
religion to be unrelated to moral judgment. Religion accounted for a mere 5% of the 
variance of DIT P-scores in a study by Dickinson and Gabriel (1982). Similarly, Radich 
(1982) studied religious youth and found no significant differences based upon religion 
(as cited in Rest, 1986). In a primary study of the DIT2, Rest et al. (1999) investigated 
200 participants, who were categorized into four groups. One group consisted of graduate 
students and included 13 seminarians. Unfortunately, Rest et al. reported the seminarians’ 
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scores as part of a larger group of professional school students, so data particular to the 
seminarians were unavailable for this literature review.  
 A particularly interesting study of Christians was conducted by Nelson (2004). 
Nelson found that while biblical literacy was related to higher P scores, those moral 
scores were still underreporting the moral thinking of Bible college students. The 
students were frequently responding favorably to stage 4 and stage 6 reasoning, but were 
rejecting stage 5. Nelson suggested studies among religious populations might be more 
accurate if scores for individual stages were also considered.  
Christians may be unwilling to adopt stage 5 reasoning, while they willingly 
adopt stage 6, because the social construction of stage 5 ethics is inconsistent with 
biblical views of human sinfulness (Nelson, 2004). The universal and cosmic nature of 
stage 6 does not have the human-created proposition of stage 5.  
In a longitudinal study over four years of college, Shaver (1984) found results 
similar to those of Nelson. Bible college students significantly decreased their use of 
reasoning at stages 2 and 3, while they increased their reasoning at stages 4 and 6. There 
was no significant change in stage 5 reasoning. The Bible college students were more 
likely to choose reasoning at stages 4 or 6 than liberal arts college students. 
The social contract/utilitarian features of stage 5 inherently contain two factors 
that may be incompatible with some Christians’ theology. First, stage 5 reasoning, 
according to Kohlberg, understood morality as arbitrary and socially constructed. Second, 
stage 5 reasoning supposed human commitment to the social structure was paramount. 
Rousseau’s (1988/1762) advice that religion and government be tools of social cohesion 
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exemplified such humanistic philosophy. Stage 6, on the other hand, presupposes pre-
existent and universal values. While Kohlberg did not contend stage 6 values were 
theocentric, stage 6 at least allowed a theology of divine preexistence. Stage 5 thinking 
was more theologically oriented toward the clock-maker theology, in which God exists 
but exerts no influence.   
Bible college students were found by Nelson (2004) to prefer stage 6 reasoning 
over stage 5 reasoning. Nelson supported Richards’s (1991) earlier findings that 
Christians frequently used stage 6 reasoning, but rejected the social contract aspects of 
stage 5 reasoning. Because P scores were comprised of the combination of stage 5 and 6 
responses, Christians P scores were below national norms. In Nelson’s study, the mean P 
score among Bible college students were 35.17 (sd = 11.69). McNeel (1994) found Bible 
college seniors had a mean P score of 37.96 (sd = 14.52) (cited in Nelson, 2004).  
Because Christians may not have been fully evaluated by P scores alone, Nelson 
(2004) recommended researchers give consideration to variations in the scores for each 
stage of moral judgment. While P scores were the focus of most DIT research, the 
statistical reports from the DIT also included the percentage of time a respondent 
preferred a rationale from each moral stage. Investigating these preferences for each 
individual stage allowed researchers to see particular stage preferences, such as stage 6 
over stage 5, which were not included in P scores.  
The hypothesis that Christians may have preferred to skip stage 5 also had 
important ramifications for interpreting data of college-aged populations. It was during 
college that most adults began to contemplate the abstract and philosophical bases for 
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principled reasoning. If non-Christians easily adapted to stage 5, they would have 
appeared to progress more quickly than Christians. Such a trend might have led 
researchers to conclude Christianity was negatively related to principled reasoning. If it 
was true, however, that Christians prefered stage 6 more frequently than non-Christians, 
the long-term result may have been that Christians more frequently attained the highest 
stage of moral reasoning. The long-term benefit may not have appeared in studies of 
Christian college students, and may not have been noticed in studies utilizing only the 
common P score.  
Some researchers have studied moral judgment as an outcome of theology. 
Childerston (1985) found students rated as fundamentalists were likely to score at stage 4, 
while students who did not fit the fundamentalist category were likely to score at stage 6. 
Copeland (1994) studied 242 Christian college students and found students with more 
fundamentalist theology scored lower on moral reasoning, using the DIT, than Christians 
who were not categorized as fundamentalists. There was a slightly negative correlation (r 
= -.13) between scores on a measure of religious fundamentalism and principled 
reasoning (Rest et al., 1999). 
Fundamentalist theology was defined in the cited studies according to the 
believer’s commitment to authority, tradition and/or literalism. Because Kohlberg and 
Rest both asserted that moral judgment is an outcome of personal reflection and cognitive 
dissonance, an inverse relationship between fundamentalism and moral judgment should 
be expected from fundamentalism, thusly defined.  
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Researchers have also investigated the religious motivation of individuals as an 
affect on moral development. Blizard (1980) found a significant relationship between 
moral reasoning and internal, as opposed to external, sources of religious authority. 
Blizard also found a relationship between P scores among Christians and moral abstract 
personal theology. In a study of 210 Christian college students, De Witt (1987) found 
small but significant differences in moral reasoning based upon the subject’s level of 
intrinsic religious motivation. Ang (1989) studied 41 Bible college students and found 
intrinsic religious motivation was related to higher moral reasoning (DIT) more than 
extrinsic motivation. Ang concluded Bible colleges should incorporate pedagogy that 
would facilitate development of intrinsic religious motivation. 
Ernsberger (1977) and Ernsberger and Manaster (1981) used the Religious 
Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) to factor intrinsic/extrinsic orientation into the 
DIT scores. They found intrinsically-oriented (church institution-oriented) church 
members were more likely to espouse moral reasoning of their church’s theology. This 
could indicate personality interaction with the DIT. Similar studies, however, did not 
result in similar observations (Brown & Annis, 1978; Waters, 1980). Ernsberger and 
Manaster’s research has not been sufficiently validated. Findings relating intrinsic 
religious motivation and authority were consistent with Fowler’s faith development 
model (Wallwork, 1980). According to Fowler, an individual’s faith was deepened and 
strengthened through thoughtful reflection on religious beliefs and a willingness to 
investigate new religious ideas.  
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Many researchers found no relationship between religious identification and 
moral judgment. Warren (1992) did not find significant differences between students at 
Christian schools and public school students. Bruggeman (1996) also found no 
relationship between attending public or private religious high schools in outcomes of P 
scores. Wahrman (1980) did not find a significant relationship between moral reasoning 
and religiosity or amount of time one has been actively religious. No significant 
differences in moral reasoning were found in the religiosity of two-year nursing students 
(Aronovitz, 1984). Guldhammer (1982) found principled reasoning increased across 
college, but the increase was unrelated to religious identification. Catholicism was found 
to be unrelated to moral development among college students (Wahrman, 1981).  
Researchers investigating religious beliefs also frequently found no relationship 
between beliefs and moral judgment. Washington (1999) did not find any relationship 
between religious beliefs and moral development or religious activities and moral 
development among 149 college students. In a study of 392 freshmen at a Christian 
college, Banks (1995) found no significant differences on DIT scores between those 
classified as liberals and those classified as conservatives on religiosity measures. In a 
convenience sample of students at a large secular university, Hansen (1995) did not find 
any relationship between moral judgment and religiosity, regardless of the liberalism or 
conservatism of the individual’s religious orientation. Wahrman (1981) found a weak 
0.153 correlation between religious dogmatism and moral development. 
Longitudinal studies were infrequent in the literature, but researchers using such 
data often reported no relationships between religion and moral judgment. McNeel 
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(1991) performed longitudinal and cross-sectional studies of students in a Christian 
college and found students showed principled level maturation equivalent to national 
norms. No statistically significant differences were reported among students at Christian 
colleges and those students attending secular schools in a study combining cross-
sectional and longitudinal data (Buier, Butman, Burwell & VanWicklin, 1989). 
Some researchers found negative relationships between religion and DIT scores. 
Hoagland (1984) found conservative Christians used less principled reasoning than 
liberals and nonreligious individuals, and conservative Christians were more likely to 
operate at conventional stages. Faqua (1983) reported Christian college students scored 
below national norms on the DIT. The lower scores were found both in science majors 
and religion majors. Being a science or a religion major was not significantly related to 
moral reasoning.  
A difference between church members and nonmembers, with nonmembers 
scoring higher on the DIT, was found by McGeorge (1976). Clouse (1991) and Stoop 
(1979) found Christians generally scored at stage 4 (as cited in Rest, 1986). In another 
study by Nelson (1998), Bible college students showed very slight progress in moral 
development and remained in the conventional stages. Ernsberger and Manaster (1981) 
found negative relationships between religiosity and moral judgment, even after 
controlling for socio-economic factors (as cited in Rest).  
Positive findings relating religion and moral judgment were reported by some 
researchers. Positive studies involving students included Harris (1981), Friend (1991) and 
Nelson (2004). Harris found biblical literacy and P scores were significantly related 
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among high school students (cited in Rest, 1986). Friend found seminary students scored 
higher on the DIT than liberal arts undergraduate students. Nelson found biblical literacy, 
moral development, and academic development progressed together among Bible college 
students, but moral development was more related to biblical literacy than academic 
development.  
As previously reported, Nelson (2004) found P scores may have underreported the 
moral thinking of Christians. Another study supporting Nelson’s proposal was conducted 
by Hsieh (2003). Hsieh asked first-year, senior and graduate students, as well as faculty, 
to complete the DIT-2 twice. In one examination, they were asked to complete the 
instrument according to their own thoughts. In another administration, participants were 
asked to complete the instrument according to their understanding of liberal values. All 
groups improved their moral reasoning scores when acting as liberals. Hsieh concluded 
educated Christians may well have understood liberal values, although their religious 
convictions led them to choose more conventional reasoning.  
Good and Cartwright (1998) found Bible college students showed moral growth 
during their freshmen year yet reverted to lower level thinking by their senior year. Good 
and Cartwright concluded the senior students had learned to think at higher stages yet 
chose to ignore that moral philosophy in favor of conforming to the expectations of their 
religious community. Wilcox (1986) reported evidence that some people may 
demonstrate lower moral reasoning because they fear being labeled as troublemakers or 
socially deviant. The immature yet principled thinker may find it difficult to advocate a 
principled life in a conventional world. Kuran (1997) has written about the common 
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phenomenon of people misrepresenting their own beliefs in order to conform to social 
norms.  
Overall, the literature available concerning moral judgment of Christians was 
quite contentious. In his detailed review of literature, Rest (1986) agreed with Kohlberg 
and concluded religion was generally independent of moral judgment. Such a conclusion 
was in contrast with the work of Fowler who directly tied the development of moral 
judgment to the development of faith. Fowler’s definition of faith, however, was not faith 
in the common religious sense (e.g., God’s providence) but rather faith in unproven ideas.   
Previous research frequently suffered from significant flaws. Any research in 
which religion was defined through self-identification or membership in an association, 
such as a church or religious college, should be considered suspect (Lee, 1980). Just as 
voter registration in a certain party does not provide significant information about a 
voter’s ideology on most issues, religious identification is not the same as religious 
conviction.  
The self-identified ideology of individuals has been found to bear almost no 
resemblance to the actual beliefs of those individuals (Converse, 1964). Further, 
Converse argued the great majority of people are so lacking in critical, especially 
abstract, thought, they cannot be said to truly hold any ideology. Personal development, 
whether in terms of moral judgment, religious faith, or political involvement, is 
contingent upon personal autonomy, thoughtful reflection, and discourse.  
Autonomous, reflective, and active religious belief should result in more 
developed moral judgment. The program evaluated in this dissertation was considered to 
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involve those developmental prerequisites. The rationale for this consideration is 
developed later in this chapter. 
DIT and Prisoners 
The shortcomings of Gilligan’s care framework have been partially addressed 
earlier in this chapter. A study by Gilgun (1995), however, bore significance for this 
dissertation. Gilgun investigated whether criminals displayed emphasis on care 
(Gilligan’s theory) or justice (Kohlberg and Rest’s theories). While the study did not 
involve the DIT, its results provided considerable support to the validity claims of the 
DIT in terms of both stage theory and applicability to the current study’s population.  
Gilgun (1995) interviewed prisoners convicted of incest to determine whether 
such offenders held justice or care moral orientations. She hypothesized offenders would 
be justice oriented, because she believed the masculine and impersonal qualities of justice 
would be more amenable to incest than the compassionate and personal concepts of care. 
She concluded, however, incest perpetrators unanimously favored care orientations. 
Incest perpetrators could more easily justify their actions through a care orientation, 
which was inherently subjective and fluid.  
In the field of corrections, the DIT has been used in many ways. For example, 
Horan and Kaplan (1983) used the DIT to understand the sentencing decisions of jurists. 
There was little research, however, directly related to this current program evaluation. 
Directly related work had been absent for some time because NOBTS was the only 
undergraduate college operating within a prison at the time of this study. 
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When the federal government cut financial aid for prisoner education, the 
University of Great Falls was operating a prison college. The University conducted a 
program evaluation in an attempt to justify state funding that would have continued the 
program. Unfortunately, they found their program had virtually no impact on the moral 
development of prisoners (Nelson, 1995). Spartanburg Methodist College also attempted 
a program evaluation to justify its prison college in the face of federal budget cuts. 
According to Everhart (1992), Spartanburg’s program provided some effect on the self-
esteem of black prisoners, but showed little else in terms of successful education. 
Prison populations were noted by Rest (1974) as being among the most difficult 
to help. Rest referred to educating prisoners as “extremely problematic” (p. 250). In fact, 
he noted an absence of literature to guide policy and specifically remarked on the need 
for such research. He warned of the potential challenge of prison rehabilitation, but 
suggested even modest gains in the moral reasoning of prisoners would be “spectacular” 
(p. 250). 
In moral development testing, prisoners generally attained P scores similar to 
middle school students (Rest, 1979b). The mean score for prisoners was 23.5, and the 
mean score for middle school students was 21.9. People at this level of reasoning tended 
to be egocentric in their moral reasoning. These scores compared with means of 31.8 for 
high school students, 40 for adults, 42.3 for college students, 59.8 for seminarians at 
liberal Protestant schools, and 65.2 for academic philosophers. Prisoners generally reason 
at stages 2 or 3, measured by Kohlberg’s model (Stevenson, Hall & Innes, 2003). 
Considering that Angola was home to only violent and habitual offenders, it may be 
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Angola inmates used moral reasoning no higher than the average for prisoners, and most 
likely reasoned at lower levels.  
One explanation for the low growth of prisoners may be found in the work of 
Jessor and Jessor (1977). They investigated the thinking of delinquent youths and found 
criminals were significantly more likely to exhibit external loci of control. External loci 
of control are inconsistent with the autonomy said to be necessary for moral growth. 
External loci of control may also make an individual less likely to engage in critical 
reflection, since the results of reflection are not likely to be viewed as useful. In order for 
the Seminary at LSP to be successful, it may need to facilitate self-empowerment of 
inmates. Such self-empowerment can be difficult in a prison population where members 
are unable to control virtually any aspect of their lives.  
DIT and Pedagogy 
The best method for moral education had been a topic of debate through much of 
human history. Aristotle and Socrates lectured on moral development in ancient Greece. 
Augustine and Erasmus proposed ideas of moral education in the ancient churches. Moral 
education pedagogy, like moral philosophy, has changed across times and places. 
Kohlberg’s general theory and advice on educational pedagogy evolved across his 
career (Rest et al, 2000). According to Rest (1974), Kohlberg’s pedagogy was a blending 
of Dewey’s philosophy and Piaget’s psychology. Kohlberg insisted any moral education 
must be based in developmental theory. Moral education could not be virtue or habit 
oriented but must have encouraged thoughtful analysis (Kohlberg, 1966). Like Kohlberg, 
 64
Rest (1986) refuted Aristotle’s assertion that morality was a product of good parenting 
and was firmly established by adulthood. According to Rest (1986), “adults show more 
change than younger participants in moral education programs” (p. 177). 
The possibility of moral growth in adulthood was essential for the success of 
criminal rehabilitation efforts. The effort at LSP presupposed moral development was 
more fluid and adaptable for adults than suggested by Aristotle. Aristotle (1994), in his 
writings, displayed a concern for justice, but he believed morality was a factor of 
pedagogy built upon pedigree. Educational theory, at least since Dewey, has been 
significantly more democratic. Additionally, earlier Christian educators, such as Erasmus 
and Raikes, believed the lowliest members of society were capable of full moral growth 
(Reed & Prevost, 1993). 
According to Kohlberg (1966), moral teaching should be targeted one stage above 
the level of the learners. Such teaching was within the limits learners were able to 
understand, while it still required the learners to stretch mentally as they sought to 
understand the materials. This teaching method was unrealistic, however. A teacher could 
not assess a learner’s response to categorize the stage and then develop an appropriate 
response, all within the timeframe available in class (Rest, 1974).  
The difficulty of individuals teaching according to developmental theory may 
have been one reason Kohlberg developed a structural approach to moral education (Bar-
Yam et al., 1980). He advocated the Just Community model, which was based on the use 
of social environments to foster moral growth. The Just Community model incorporated 
democratic governance, even with small children. The democratic principles facilitated 
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the dialogue necessary for exposure to new ideas, especially the controversial ideas 
traditionally repressed in less open societies.  
Just communities operated through a social contract system, which was based in 
principled reasoning. An example Kohlberg provided for a Just Community was the 
kibbutz movement, which expanded through Israel in the 1970s. Kohlberg believed the 
religious socialism of the Jewish kibbutz was consistent with the democratic debate 
necessary for moral development (Bar-Yam et al., 1980).  
A kibbutz was a small, communal, egalitarian microcosm. Rules in a kibbutz were 
socially created. Once rules were created, however, significant social pressure was placed 
on individuals to maintain obligations under the social contract. This social pressure 
sustaining kibbutz life seemed inconsistent with the philosophy of moral autonomy and 
self-created moral principles Kohlberg formed from Kant. Kohlberg explained the 
pressure was not inconsistent with his Kantian philosophy, however, because the pressure 
existed to encourage more moral behavior (Bar-Yam et al., 1980).   
The founding principle of a kibbutz was a commitment to the creation of social 
justice. Therefore, the kibbutz social pressure was a pressure to be more just. Kohlberg 
viewed this pressure as something to facilitate the principled reasoning of the individual, 
who has presumably self-committed to justice. In other words, the kibbutz pressure was 
opposite of the social pressure that motivated individuals to surrender principles to the 
convention of society (Good & Cartwright, 1998; Kuran, 1997, Wilcox, 1986). In terms 
of the neo-Kohlbergian model, the Just Community used social pressure to bridge the 
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gaps between moral judgment (component 2), moral motivation (component 3) and moral 
virtue (component 4). 
Kohlberg viewed religious systems to be external orders, which were rooted in 
stage 4 thinking (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). Orders, whether from a visiting angel, the 
Ten Commandments, the Bible, or a priest, were rules and not principles. Consequently, 
Kohlberg viewed religious education as being of little moral value. According to 
Kohlberg (1966), religious education was almost never effective in advancing moral 
thought. This reinforced Kohlberg’s definition of religion in terms of social systems (e.g, 
churches and denominations) rather than in terms internal belief systems.  
Researchers have often come to different conclusions about religion’s impact on 
morality when they considered religion at the individual level. Ang (1989) reported 
intrinsically motivated Christians exhibited higher moral reasoning than extrinsically 
motivated individuals. Religion that was internalized and personally meaningful, then, 
appeared to have benefits for moral judgment. Ang investigated students at a Bible 
college who were presumably the more theologically conventional members of their 
religious communities. Ang concluded religious education pedagogy targeted at 
developing internal religious reflection led to greater moral development.  
Rest (1986) supported the idea that one’s motivation toward education was a great 
influence on moral development. He also supported the Kohlbergian combination of 
individual reflection and social support for moral development. 
Development proceeds most when the person seeks to develop and when the 
situation fosters and supports development. Personal characteristics and 
environmental characteristics mutually influence each other. (p. 52) 
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The people who develop in moral judgment are those who love to learn, who seek 
new challenges, who enjoy intellectually stimulating environments, who are 
reflective, who make plans and set goals, who take risks, who see themselves in 
the larger social contexts of history and institutions and broad cultural trends, who 
take responsibility for themselves and their environs (p. 177) 
 
In general, prison inmates have not normally been academically oriented. This 
may be a primary reason why prison education programs tend to receive little interest 
from prisoners (Everhart, 1992). Contrarily, the LSP program’s enrollment capacity was 
not large enough to satisfy the amount of interest from inmates. It was unknown, 
however, what actually motivated students to participate in the program. It was possible 
students simply wanted to alleviate boredom as was reported by many participants in 
Everhart’s study. It may also have been these seminarians genuinely wanted to work in 
ministry. A vocational interest in ministry did not, however, necessarily demonstrate an 
academic interest in theology. 
The vocational and practical foci of the LSP Seminary may have had a positive 
influence on moral development even apart from academic interest in theology. Deemer 
(1987) found a relationship between vocational satisfaction and moral judgment. 
According to Rest (1986), the Deemer coding method “gives more importance to the 
subject’s own sense of identity and doing personally meaningful work than to financial 
security” (p. 54). This could have benefited students in Angola, because they presumably 
committed themselves to a religious vocation they believed would be meaningful and 
would fulfill their ‘calling.’ Maslow (1987/1954) proposed vocation was important to 
personal fulfillment and growth. If the LSP Seminary facilitated a student’s vocational 
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development and personal fulfillment, the educational atmosphere may have been more 
conducive to moral growth.  
Another important finding from Deemer (1987) was his identification of “civic 
responsibility” and “political awareness” as important factors relating to moral judgment 
(as cited in Rest, 1986, pp. 54-55). The prison environment was noted earlier as being 
overwhelmingly inconsistent with any sort of social activism. LSP’s warden, Burl Cain, 
noted traditional corrections theory rejected any sort of empowerment for prisoners. 
Many in the corrections field criticized the LSP Seminary precisely because it 
empowered students (Frink, 2002).  
Wright (2001) found community service was not related to increased moral 
development among students at a Christian college. Wright investigated community 
service requirements as part of a Christian college curriculum. Community service, 
especially externally organized community service, was not the same as the civic 
empowerment and activism investigated by Deemer (1987).  
Education was related to moral development. According to Rest (1986), “One of 
the strongest and most consistent correlates of development in moral judgment have been 
years in formal education, even more so than chronological age per se” (p. 33). Rest 
noted, however, that “short-term” moral education programs, lasting fewer than three 
weeks, had not been shown to be effective. Moral education programs, such as found in 
semester-long ethics courses, could be effective in producing small improvements in P 
scores. Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) noted college, overall, was a substantial catalyst 
for moral development.  
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Despite research showing certain programs, and education in general, to be a 
positive influences on moral development, the exact experiences that cause moral growth 
were still unknown. Rest (1986) compared research attempts to discern which life 
experiences foster moral growth to research attempts to discern which foods make people 
obese. There was no clear answer because different people gained moral judgment from 
different experiences just as different people gained weight from different foods.  
Moral development appeared to be more gradual than punctuated. While general 
activities, such as college attendance, were related to development, Rest (1986) could not 
identify specific moments or moral issues that caused growth. An experiential example 
provided by Rest was that the socio-moral issues of dodging the Selective Service draft 
did not discernibly affect moral judgment. Rest (1974) did identify participative 
education as one pedagogical technique with the potential for moral impact. Moral 
development could be fostered by providing students with opportunities to involve 
themselves in new “social roles,” such as “teacher, counselor, or caretaker.” The key to 
such moral growth opportunities was to provide students with “real responsibility” (Rest, 
1974, p. 255).  
The LSP Seminary students were active in their religious communities and were 
involved in the field where they felt called for their vocations. The program’s addition of 
internships allowed the practice of pastoral responsibility among students. A pastor has 
been biblically defined in Rest’s terms of being a “teacher, counselor, [and] caretaker.” 
As students studying pastoral work, and actively involved in aspects of that work, the 
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LSP students may have been exposed to the developmental catalysts infamously absent in 
the corrections system.  
Clinical Pastor Education (CPE) training significantly increased the moral 
reasoning of seminary students who were below their group average at the beginning of 
training (Leeland, 1990). No significant change was found in those students who began 
the program at the average or higher than average levels of moral reasoning. It was 
unknown whether the more advanced students had previously been exposed to the 
learning experiences provided by CPE, and were therefore less affected by it, or whether 
CPE was generally less effective for advanced moral thinkers. Regardless of the reason 
advanced thinkers benefited less from pastoral experiences as part of their education, 
Leeland’s findings were significant for the LSP population.  If LSP students began their 
education at the low levels of moral reasoning expected of prisoners, the practical 
education of LSP should have been quite beneficial. 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
MBTI Construction 
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, developed by Katherine Briggs and Isabel 
Briggs Myers, was based upon Carl Jung’s psychological theory. Jung posited human 
personalities could be classified according to the methods by which individuals 
cognitively received new information, and the processes by which individuals processed 
that information. For each consideration, there were two personality types. People 
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received information either intuitively or through the senses. The person with a 
preference for Intuition (N) preferred to receive information as concepts or systems. The 
person with a preference for Sensing (S) preferred to receive information in practical or 
concrete manners (Myers et al., 2003).  
People processed information either through thinking or through feelings. The 
person with a preference for Thinking (T) preferred to process information through 
objective, rational analysis. The person with a preference for Feeling (F) preferred to 
process information by evaluating the information in accordance with personal values 
(Myers et al., 2003).  
Briggs and Myers (Myers et al., 2003) further developed Jung’s theory to include 
two more aspects of personality. They added considerations of how a person interacted 
with the world, and how people acted upon their information processing. Briggs and 
Myers proposed people were either Extroverts (E) or Introverts (I), and either Judging (J) 
or Perceiving (P). Introverts preferred to focus their energy internally. Extroverts 
preferred to focus their energy externally. People who preferred Judging worked to make 
decisions with their information and to organize their environs. People who preferred 
Perceiving were more inclined to leave evaluations of information flexible and adaptable.  
Although each dichotomy (i.e., E/I, S/N, T/F, J/P) of the MBTI operated 
independently of the others, the combinations formed the full MBTI personality “type.” 
Someone with preferences for Extraversion, Intuition, Thinking, and Judging was not 
merely an E, an N, a T, and a J. The person was an ENTJ. The interaction of each 
independent dichotomy created a unique total personality. Thinking Extroverts did their 
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thinking differently than Thinking Introverts. In total, there were 16 MBTI types (Myers 
et al., 2003).  
The MBTI instrument was a paper and pencil, multiple choice assessment 
administered by practitioners qualified according to the guidelines of the MBTI 
publisher, the Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT). CAPT allowed 
practitioners to be qualified through academic credentials, CAPT training, or university 
supervision. The researcher conducting this study was qualified by CAPT through all 
three criteria.  
Item statements in the MBTI were similar in theoretical construction to those in 
the DIT. The wordings were provided in a manner that elicited specific thoughts in 
individual readers. At the same time, statements did not provide the details necessary for 
readers to construct a new concept or discern the instrument’s intention. Like the DIT, the 
MBTI had been used for decades, administered to multitudes of people, and utilized and 
validated through thousands of studies (Myers et al., 2003). 
An important feature of the MBTI was the theoretical assumption that all MBTI 
personality types were inherently natural and healthy. Unlike many other psychological 
measures, such as the Neo Personality Assessment, the MBTI could not be used to 
classify anyone as ordinally higher or lower than anyone else. The MBTI was designed to 
help individuals understand themselves and others, not to form a basis for diagnosing or 
treating participants (Myers et al., 2003). Table 1 provides information on the distribution 
of personality types in the American population.  
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Table 1  
Type of Percentage of US Population Demographic Groups 
Type US Total Blacks Males Male College
Students
ISTJ 12-16 15.0 16.4 12.48
ISFJ  10-13 12.7 8.1 5.44
INFJ  2-3 1.4 1.2 2.65
INTJ  3-4 1.9 3.3 5.40
ISTP  5-7 5.8 8.5 6.81
ISFP  5-7 10.0 7.6 4.09
INFP  4-5 2.5 4.1 5.32
INTP  5-6 3.6 4.8 6.63
ESTP  5-7 6.1 5.6 6.72
ESFP  6-9 9.7 6.9 4.41
ENFP  6-8 8.9 6.4 6.26
ENTP  4-7 1.4 4.0 6.77
ESTJ  10-12 8.9 11.2 12.81
ESFJ  10-12 8.6 7.5 5.46
ENFJ  3-5 1.1 1.6 2.98
ENTJ  3-5 2.5 2.7 5.78
E  50-55 47.1 45.9 51.18
I  45-50 52.9 54.1 48.82
S  65-70 76.8 71.7 58.22
N  30-35 23.2 28.3 41.78
T  45-55 42.7 56.5 63.4
F  45-55 57.3 43.5 36.6
P 40-45 47.9 48.0 47.0
J 55-60 52.1 52.0 53.0
 
Note.  Data collected from Myers et al., 2003. 
 
MBTI and the DIT 
Because the MBTI presupposed all personality types were inherently equal in 
terms of psycho-social value, it would have been reasonable to think personality types 
were unrelated to moral judgment. Research did not support that presupposition, 
however. The philosophical foundations of Kohlberg were predisposed to certain 
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personality types. The differences in moral reasoning related to personality type were not 
a reason to discount either instrument, however. Instead, a theoretical synthesis of the 
DIT and MBTI can actually help evaluators and educators. Evaluators may integrate the 
MBTI instrument with moral evaluation to better understand research results. Educators 
may use an understanding of the MBTI theory to create pedagogy that better addresses 
the individual student. 
The Kantian ethical system of evaluating individual actions through universalized 
systems was Intuitive (N), rather than Sensing (S). The objective, formal Thinking (T) 
preference was more aligned with the calculated rationalism of Kant than the personal 
values orientation of the Feeling (F) preference. The reflective nature of Introversion (I) 
was logically more related to Kantian ethics than the social orientation of Extraversion 
(E). Finally, the tentativeness and openness of Perceiving (P) types was hypothetically 
more inclined toward postconventional growth than the Judging (J) preference, which 
was related to preferences for definition and closure. In theory, then, an INTP would have 
been most amenable to moral development, and an ESFJ would have been least amenable 
to moral development. 
Advanced moral thinking was contingent upon the synthesis and systemization of 
abstract principles and philosophies (Rest, 1974). Such higher order thinking was similar 
to the descriptions of Thinking (T) and especially Intuition (N) in Myers-Briggs 
typology. Feeling (F) oriented people sought decision-making through subjectively 
evaluating the scenario, whereas Thinking (T) oriented people were more likely to seek 
the incorporation of universal principles. Intuitive types looked for the whole system in 
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operation, while Sensors sought the obvious answer to the present circumstances (Myers 
et al., 2003).  
According to Hirsh and Kise (2000), NTs were likely to create new systems for 
application and SFs frequently worked to build community. Therefore, NTs were 
naturally consistent with Kohlberg’s theory, while SFs were more naturally inclined 
toward conventional reasoning. Hasler (1987) hypothesized the Introverted (I) personality 
type would be related to higher moral reasoning, as measured by the Sociomoral 
Reflection Objective Measure (SROM). Hasler, however, found the E/I scale was not 
related to moral development, while the J/P scale was significant to moral development. 
Those with Perceiving (P) preferences were likely to score higher on moral reasoning 
than those with Judging (J) preferences. Hasler concluded the closure-seeking tendencies 
of Js made them less likely to seek and internalize the new experiences necessary to 
cause moral growth. 
The relationship between personality type and moral reasoning was investigated 
by O’Brien (2000). She found the perception (S/N) and judging (T/F) functions were both 
significantly related to moral reasoning scores. Additionally, the perception and judging 
functions combined to create a significant interaction effect for moral reasoning. The 
Feeling (F) preference was significantly related to more frequent use of stage 3 reasoning 
than the Thinking (T) preference. Intuition (N) judgment was related to more frequent 
post-conventional moral reasoning than Sensing (S). Taylor (1992) also found Thinking 
(T) was related to higher moral reasoning than Feeling (F). Contrary to most research, 
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McMahon (1992) found the Feeling (F) preference was related to higher moral reasoning. 
Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were related to stage 4 reasoning. 
Redford (1993) hypothesized higher moral reasoning among people with 
preferences for Extraversion (E), Intuition (N), Thinking (T) and/or Perceiving (P) 
preferences. She found ISFJ and ISTJ were both underrepresented among participants 
with above-average moral reasoning. Further findings included the Intuitive (N) and 
Introverted Perceiving (IP) preferences were significantly related to above average moral 
reasoning. Redford concluded the moral growth of ISJs was slowed because they were 
more focused on the present and less willingly to entertain conflicting paradigms.  
Unlike O’Brien (2000), Redford (1993) did not find significant moral reasoning 
differences between participants with Thinking (T) and Feeling (F) preferences. 
Redford’s research built upon the findings of Catoe (1992) and Denny (1988). Catoe 
(1992) found Intuition (N) was related to higher moral reasoning than Sensing (S) and 
Denny (1988) found no difference in moral reasoning based upon the Thinking (T) or 
Feeling (F) preferences of the participants. Denny (1988) did not use the DIT or MJI but 
chose the Social Reflection Questionnaire (SRM). The difference in method may account 
for not finding a relationship between MBTI preference and moral reasoning.  
Gilligan’s theory of women using a care orientation, as opposed to male justice, 
had not been validated by subsequent research. Gender differences in personality type 
might be used to partially explain some moral orientations. Women were moderately 
more likely to prefer Feeling (F), and men were moderately more likely to prefer 
Thinking (T) (Myers et al., 2003).  
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A relationship between Feeling and care is not necessarily supportive of 
Gilligan’s theory.  Neither is it contrary to Kohlberg’s claims of a universal moral theory. 
Additionally, the MBTI preferences were not absolute descriptions of human thought and 
action. A preference simply implied the most natural behavior for an individual. In fact, a 
fundamental part of MBTI theory was that all people used all preference types at some 
time. An Introvert was not absolutely disinterested in socializing. A person who preferred 
Feeling (e.g., values) was not absolutely disinterested in objectivity. Therefore, a person 
with a preference for Extraversion, Sensing, Feeling and/or Judging was not incapable of 
using the opposite types, which were more related to principled moral judgment. 
Moreover, mature personality development included the practice of using the less 
preferred types (Myers et al., 2003).  
If a person who preferred Feeling was not naturally drawn to the objectivity and 
impersonality of Kantian autonomy and rationalism, mature type development would 
allow that Feeling person to use the Thinking preference well enough to incorporate 
moral principles. Similarly, people who preferred Thinking may have been naturally 
drawn toward autonomy and impersonality, but those people should develop the Feeling 
aspect of personality well enough to develop and incorporate values into their 
rationalism.  
The humanistic rationalism of Kant, the cognitive psychology of Kohlberg, the 
personality typology of Myers and Briggs, and even Christian theology all assume a basic 
human dignity from which each person can develop to healthy personal fulfillment. 
Researchers have generally found Introversion (I), Intuition (N), Thinking (T) and 
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Perceiving (P) to be influences on higher levels of moral judgment. One’s MBTI type 
preference was an influence on the path to one’s moral development but was not the 
arbitrator of one’s moral development. Personality was not destiny.  
MBTI and Christians 
MBTI personality preferences have been shown to be related to moral judgment. 
Some researchers have also reported certain type preferences were over- or 
underrepresented among Christians. Additionally, some researchers have found particular 
personality types were more predictive of vocational interest in ministry.  
Childerston (1985) reported moral reasoning was related to fundamentalist 
theology and type preference was related to level of fundamentalism, making type 
preference indirectly related to moral reasoning among Bible college students. 
Childerston noted this was an important distinction because unlike moral stages, no type 
was presumed to be better than another. The key to moral development for Bible college 
students with the Sensing preference, who were overrepresented in the Bible college, was 
in mature type development in which people exercised their secondary preferences (i.e., 
Intuition). 
College students with higher DIT scores were found by Volker (1979) to be less 
religiously active than the average (as cited in Rest, 1986) for college students. This 
could have been a factor of the Extraversion/Introversion dichotomy. Introverts were 
more likely to score well on tests and less likely to be involved in any social communities 
(Myers et al., 2003). If actively religious people were more likely to be Extraverts, and 
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Extraverts scored lower on the DIT, it may have been Extraversion and not religious 
activity that was directly related to lower levels of moral judgment.   
MBTI preferences bore tremendous relationships with individuals’ interests in 
religion, moral autonomy and vocational ministry. Table 2 shows type preferences related 
to such issues. ISTPs, INTPs, INFPs and ENTPs were the four groups most likely to rank 
“autonomy” as “very important.” ISFJs, ESFPs, ESFJs and INFJs were most likely to 
rank “spirituality” as “very important” (Myers et al., 2003, p. 315). INTPs were the most 
likely type to desire autonomy, while ESFJs were the least likely to desire autonomy. 
Conversely, INTPs were least likely to desire spirituality, while ESFJs were most likely 
to desire spirituality. 
 
Table 2  
Type Correlation with Values and Careers 
Type Values 
Autonomy 
Values 
Spirituality 
Vocational 
Ministry 
ISFJ  X  
INFJ  X X 
ISTP X   
INFP X   
INTP Xa Y  
ESFP  X  
ENFP   X 
ENTP X   
ESFJ Y Xa X 
ENFJ   X 
 
Note.  Data collected from Myers et al., 2003. Xa = Type with highest correlation to 
descriptor. Y = Type with lowest correlation to descriptor. 
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The types most likely to enter careers in ministry were INFJ, ISFJ, ENFP, ENFJ 
and ESFJ. Ministry careers were among the 10 most common careers for 6 of the 8 
Feeling (F) types. Additionally, the five types most likely to enter vocational ministry 
included all four FJ types (INFJ, ISFJ, ENFJ and ESFJ). Notably, vocational ministry 
was not listed as one of the 10 most likely careers for any Thinking (T) type. Vocational 
ministry was one of the 10 least likely careers for INTP, ENTP, ENTJ, ESTP, ISTP, 
ISTJ, accounting for six of the eight Thinking (T) types (Myers et al., 2003). The Feeling 
preference was highly related to ministry careers, while the Thinking preference was a 
clear predictor of disinterest in ministry careers.  
The relationships between MBTI preferences and religious vocations were studied 
by Ruppart (1985). Catholic priests and nuns were likely to be ISFJs. Protestant and 
Jewish clergy were frequently ENFJs. Considering all clergy together, nearly four-fifths 
were Feeling (F) oriented and almost three-quarters were Judging (J) oriented. The 
ministerial type was FJ, while fewer than one in ten clergy were NTs or SPs. Phoon 
(1987) found ESFJs were significantly overrepresented among Seventh Day Adventist 
clergy. 
The findings relating to types among clergy did not indicate that people of less 
common types were ill-suited for ministry. The MBTI was not a career placement test. In 
Phoon’s (1987) study of Seventh Day Adventists, she found Introverts (I) often found 
ways to serve through behind-the-scenes activities, such as prayer. Those participants 
who saw themselves as church leaders, whether pastoral leaders, or managerial leaders, 
were more likely to have Extraverted (E) preferences. In another study of career 
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satisfaction among clergy, Thinkers (T) were more satisfied with administrative 
responsibilities, while Sensors (S) were more satisfied with interpersonal responsibilities 
(Johnson, 1991). 
Three important studies involved investigations of personality types among 
Southern Baptist ministers. Whelchel (1996) studied MBTI type frequencies of 2,630 
Southern Baptist missionaries which accounted for three-quarters of all SBC 
missionaries. Whelchel obtained the data from the SBC which had administered the 
MBTI to every new missionary for the previous decade. He found Sensing (S) and 
Feeling (F) preferences were most common. However, Intuitive (N) types were most 
likely to persevere in missions. Sanson (2000) studied Southern Baptist pastors seeking 
the Doctor of Ministry degree and found Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were 
the most common and overrepresented among the pastors. Berryhill (1991) found Feeling 
(F) was overrepresented among seminarians at the Southern Baptist Theological 
Seminary.  
The Berryhill (1991), Whelchel (1996) and Sanson (2000) studies bore significant 
relevance for this program evaluation, but they also involved some distinctions from this 
research. Berryhill studied students at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in 
Lousiville, KY . Whechel studied international missionaries. Sanson studied professional 
doctoral students. In general, their findings supported the common findings that Sensing 
(S), Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences were overrepresented among ministers. 
Bramer (1995) also found S, F and J preferences were related to ministerial careers 
among evangelical ministers. Further, Bramer found type differences were related to 
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preferences for types of ministerial roles and the social attributes individuals preferred in 
their churches.   
Sensing and Judging preferences on the MBTI have been found to be predictive 
of conventional moral reasoning among Bible college students. Intuitive (N) preferences 
were predictive of less fundamentalist theology than Sensing (S) preferences among 
Bible college students (Childerston, 1985). Lee (1985) found MBTI personality types 
related to significant differences in commitment to the theological tenants of one’s 
church. The Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences predicted greater commitment. SF 
and J preferences were overrepresented among religiously conservative males. Harman 
(1982) found the Feeling (F) preference was overrepresented among students entering a 
Church of Christ college. 
People with a preference for Sensing (S) tended to seek hands-on careers. Those 
who preferred Feeling (F) sought careers that combined “service” and were 
“harmonious.” Those with a preference for Judging (J) sought careers that operated 
according to a “system and order.” The fit between SFJ preferences and ministerial 
careers was clear. By contrast, the Intuitive (N) preference led toward careers involving 
“new problems to be solved.” The Perceiving (P) preference led toward work based on 
“understanding situations; Thinking (T) led to careers with “logical…ideas” (Myers et 
al., 2003, p. 293.) The inclinations of NTP types, who were very unlikely to enter 
ministry, fit more closely with Kohlberg’s theory than did the inclinations of SFJs who 
were quite likely to enter ministry.  
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MBTI and Prisoners 
Very little research has been conducted to learn about personality types and 
criminology. Lippin (1988) investigated personality types among female prisoners in 
Maryland. Livernoise (1987) studied personality types among male prisoners in the 
Orange County, FL jail. Combined, their studies provided interesting information on 
personalities and criminal behavior. Their studies, however, were limited to small 
populations and were not necessarily generalizable.  
Thinking (T) was overrepresented among the females (Lippin, 1988); the 
preference for Thinking (T) was especially pronounced in women convicted of crimes 
involving drugs or violence. Livernoise (1987), whose findings are displayed in Table 3, 
found Feeling (F) to be overrepresented among males. Lippin’s finding that Thinking (T) 
was related to criminal behavior was counterintuitive. One possible interpretation may be 
a relationship between low levels of education and criminal behavior in Thinkers (T). 
Perhaps the low education common among the female prisoners restricted the women’s 
ability to adequately utilize their Thinking (T) preferences. Lippin and Livernoise both 
found Introverts (I) were overrepresented among the incarcerated populations. 
The inclusion of males in Livernoise’s (1987) study was particularly relevant to 
this research project. In general, Livernoise found the Intituition (I), Sensing (S) and 
Feeling (F) preferences were related to incarceration, while Extraversion (E), Intuition 
(N) and Thinking (T) types were underrepresented. SJs and FJs were overrepresented 
among those convicted of sexual crimes. IPs were overrepresented among inmates 
convicted of violent crimes and EPs were overrepresented among crimes involving theft. 
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Table 3  
Relationships between Personality and Criminal Charges 
Charge Types Overrepresented 
 
Types Underrepresented 
All Charges ISTP, ESFP, ESFJ, I, S,  
F, SP, SF, TP 
 
INTJ, ISFP, ESTJ, ENTJ,  
E, N, T, IN, NT, EJ 
Murder IP 
 
 
Sexual Misconduct ESFJ, J, SJ, FJ 
 
P 
Kidnapping INFP, IN 
 
 
Drugs ENTJ, EJ 
 
 
All Personal Assault INFP 
 
EP 
Burglary, Theft, and Robbery 
 
ENFP, EP 
 
 
 
Note.  Data collected from Livernoise (1987). Study included 298 inmates at a county 
jail. 
 
MBTI and LSP 
Overall, the literature on the DIT and the MBTI did not indicate LSP Seminary 
students should have been expected to do well on a measure of moral judgment. Table 4 
provides a synthesis of findings concerning the DIT and MBTI as related to this study.  
Prisoners typically had very low moral judgment abilities. Christians, as well, 
frequently scored below comparative averages on the DIT. The review of data on the 
MBTI revealed the MBTI preferences most common to Christians, ministers, prisoners, 
and blacks were all predictive of lower than average DIT scores. Quite simply, the LSP 
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Seminary students were expected to have most personality type factors working against 
them. 
 
Table 4  
Personality Relationships to Descriptors 
Descriptors Types Overrepresented 
High P score N, T, P, IP 
Low P score S, F, J 
Prisoners I, S, F, SP, SF, IP 
Ministers S, F, J 
Religious S, F, J, SF 
 
Theology 
This program evaluation was intended to measure the success of the NOBTS 
program at LSP in promoting moral development among students. In order to devise a 
method for such an evaluation, it was necessary to have an understanding of moral 
development theory. Equally important, however, was to understand what moral 
philosophy was most fitting for an evaluation of the Seminary. An appropriate program 
evaluation cannot measure the program against a standard incongruent with the program 
curriculum and goals.  
Kohlberg’s (1966) developmental model of morality was just one of many moral 
philosophies. The literature concerning Kohlberg’s model and Christian populations was 
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mixed. Some researchers reported no significant relationship between religiosity and 
morality. Other researchers found a negative relationship between Christianity and moral 
judgment. Few researchers found religiosity to be beneficial to moral development.  
While Kohlberg (1966) and the theological frame of the Seminary diverged in 
significant areas, these differences were not so great as to negate the use of Kohlberg’s 
theory within a Christian context. Further, the literature reviewed indicated Baptist 
theology was principled in terms of Kohlberg’s model.  
Kohlberg and Theology 
Kohlberg’s (1967) bias against religion and his limited understanding of religion 
led him to misinterpret Christianity is some ways that negatively affect Christians 
evaluated using his model. These issues, once understood, may serve to bridge the gap 
between Kohlberg and Christianity and lead to more valid evaluations of Kohlberg, the 
DIT, and Christian moral programs.  
Kohlberg’s (1967) conclusion that religion was extraneous to moral development 
was meaningless, because Kohlberg defined religion by religious affiliation (Lee, 1980). 
Religious scholars considered self-identified religious affiliation to be minimally related 
to actual religiosity. Kohlberg’s conclusions were biased by definition of religious belief.  
The stages of Christian beliefs were directly compared to the stages of moral 
development by Kohlberg and Power (1981). Stage 3 was based on relationships in both 
Christian faith and moral development. Stage 3 religious thinking was described as 
defining sin as acts leading to embarrassment before God. In stage 4, moral decisions 
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were deferred to God’s law. Stage 5 reasoning was based on the social contract and 
included God as a partner in the contract. In this stage, Kohlberg believed religion helped 
to supplement moral reasoning with a sense of meaning. Stage 6 was represented by 
luminaries, such as Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi, and Mother Teresa (Kohlberg & 
Power, 1981).  
Despite Kohlberg’s (1967) antagonism toward religious moral education, he 
noticed an undeniable relationship between religiosity and the people who he deemed 
most moral. Kohlberg considered Martin Luther King and Thomas Aquinas to be 
examples of stage 6 reasoning because both were determined to satisfy universal moral 
standards that were transcendental rather than governmental. Such transcendental moral 
principles were of paramount importance to Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Power, 1981; 
Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990). 
Kohlberg and Power (1981) praised the moral concern of Christian theology but 
also declared that concern to be lower level thinking. They viewed the connection 
between God and the believer as inconsistent with autonomy.  
Christianity and Judaism…view God’s principal concern as being not for cultic 
worship but for love and justice. They emphasize that to be in harmony with God 
people must act morally, but they also stress that people must rely on God in order 
to live a moral life. (p. 321) 
 
On one hand, Christians believed in principles of love (agape) and justice. On the 
other hand, Christians believed in obeying God’s call for love and justice. For Kohlberg 
and Power (1981), the externality of God defiled Christian principles.  
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Kohlberg and Power (1981) continued to make the same mistakes as past 
secularists. According to Beach (1952), secular rationalist philosophers, such as Kant, 
accepted the role of religion in the morality of some of humanity’s greatest heroes. They 
treated each hero’s religion, however, as if it were somehow superfluous and dependent 
upon the innate qualities of the individuals (Beach). The error led such philosophers to 
the conclusion that true morality was always independent of religion.  
Ferre (1951) explained Kierkegaard’s theology of the relationship between God 
and good:  
God and the true good cannot be separated. God does not do the good because the 
good is primary, nor does the good depend upon any arbitrary decree of deity. 
God is and does the good because his nature is and constitutes the nature of 
goodness. In so far as man knows the good, that far he knows God, and hence that 
good cannot be suspended without both violation of the ethical order and sinning 
against God. (pp. 246-247) 
 
When Kohlberg evaluated Christians using his model, the Christians were 
evaluated as much by the semantics of their responses as by the meaning of those 
responses (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). It was not enough for Christians to appeal to love 
or justice; the Christians must have appealed using the right phraseology.  
The Golden Rule was cited by Kohlberg (1973) as an example of principled 
reasoning because it was abstract. He contrasted the biblical imperative of the Golden 
Rule to the Ten Commandments which he stated were more concrete and legalistic. Still, 
the Golden Rule, according to Kohlberg (1973), was not always principled. Kohlberg 
(1973) claimed the Golden Rule could also be used in stage 3 or stage 6 reasoning. The 
variable nature of the Golden Rule led Kohlberg to conclude Christian moral philosophy 
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had no inherent moral stage. This conclusion, once again, reinforced Kohlberg’s belief 
that religion was naturally inactive in moral development and merely supported moral 
reasoning achieved autonomously. 
Comparing the biblical system to the Kohlbergian system was a method toward 
evaluating the compatibility of Christian theology and Kohlberg’s philosophy. According 
to Aron (1977), in stage 4 reasoning “morality is conceived of as simply obeying existing 
laws and rules” (p. 206). In Stage 5, “morality is seen as transcending civil society and 
pertaining to the rights and duties of humanity as a whole” (p. 206). Finally, “the stage 6 
individual sees it as his or her duty to enforce the rights of others” (p. 206). Analyzed in 
these terms, Christianity most closely fits stage 6. A difficulty in assigning stage 6 to 
Christian theology, however, was applying Kohlberg’s (1981) own determination that 
stealing the drug was a duty for everyone because all persons would want the drug stolen 
if they were in the situation of Heinz’s wife.  
Baptist theology was unmistakably principled in many other ways. For example, 
Kohlberg (1982) cited liberty of conscience as principled stage 5 philosophy. The 
Christian theology of love (agape) was especially central to understanding both Kohlberg 
and Christianity. Kohlberg and Power (1981) considered the Christian theology of agape 
to be consistent with the highest stage of moral reasoning. Agape, constituting overriding, 
universal and consistent love for others and was a principal factor of Christianity. The 
authors also noted that while love, was a general religious theme, Christian agape was 
especially comprehensive and principled. They contrasted the active morality of agape 
with the passive doctrine of karma.  
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Kohlberg and Power (1981) addressed the question of whether the moral apex of 
agape, based in love, was in conflict with justice. In their conclusion, agape presupposed 
justice and was, therefore, not in conflict. The idea of agape progressing from justice then 
raised the question of whether agape was superior to justice, and therefore a seventh 
stage. They believed agape and justice were so interconnected that neither could be said 
to supersede the other. Agape and justice were coequal. Kohlberg and Power’s 
explanation, however, did not entirely resolve their questions. They noted a community 
of Christians would “work selflessly together for one end, the glory of God as defined by 
their common religion” (p. 352). Yet they failed to address exactly how such people 
would respond to moral dilemma questions and why they would not be categorized as 
stage 4 thinkers for appealing to their external religion. Instead of directly answering such 
questions, Kohlberg and Power appealed to a perceived flexibility in their model.  
The key to higher order thinking was the abstract concern for justice, rather than 
the outcome of that justice. Christians could appeal to God’s glory as an outcome of just 
thinking, while devotees of other philosophies could appeal to other ideal outcomes. So, 
it was clear Kohlberg and Power (1981) believed actualized Christians would be stage 6 
thinkers. The question remained as to whether actualized Christians would be scored as 
principled thinkers using Kohlberg’s methodology.  
Stage 7 
Kohlberg and Power (1981) noted that while pure reason could provide 
knowledge of what should be done in a given situation, reason could not provide 
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motivation to do right when the costs became great. At that point, religion became a great 
basis for people to bear the costs of morality. Unfortunately, Kohlberg and Power (1981) 
treated religion, not as a true source of motivation, but as a psychological source. In other 
words, religion was much like a crutch for weak-willed people to build the courage to act 
on the morals they knew were just. 
Kohlberg and Power (1981) argued the Christian concept of agape was in addition 
to the basic concept of justice. In their theory of a stage 7, based on agape, they defined 
agape as an act beyond the call of moral duty.  This was a great addition but not 
necessary to achieve optimal stage 6 morality. 
Many Christians were grappling with the complexity of moral dilemmas and the 
demands of justice well before Kohlberg began his research. For many Christians, agape 
was not an addition to morality, but the essence of morality. Justice was a foundation for 
many Christian ethics, but justice was insufficient in itself. A religion or ethic absent of 
agape would not bear any resemblance to Christianity. At the same time, the Christian 
ethic was based on the presumed foundation of justice.  
Several years before Kohlberg wrote his dissertation that began his career, Beach 
(1952) foreshadowed Kohlberg and Power’s (1981) stage 7. 
A Christian social ethics can be based on the Bible only in a derivative sense…. 
Biblical morality throws light only obliquely on such pressing moral questions as 
the relation of justice and love, the criterion for choice among competing 
neighbor-claims, the issue of compromise and strategy within a social order which 
constricts all feasible choices down to evil options, the dialectic of freedom and 
order, etc. These are the central working problems of the Christian in the social 
arena. The New Testament ‘law of love’ can and must preside over the Christian 
debate on these matters, but in itself it is a remote judge. Mutually self-
contradictory policies can often claim its sanction. (p. 116) 
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In the moral systems of Kant, Rawls and Kohlberg, development consisted 
partially of deciding what to value. For the Christian, the ultimate values were 
established. The abstract and cognitive question for Christians was how to apply those 
values. A Christian could not live out Christian ethics by following rules or developing 
the habits of virtue. The Bible served as a resource for the Christian to interpret what 
principles existed (e.g., love and justice), but the Bible did not contain rules for the 
knowing the loving and just action for a particular time and place. The Christian, then, 
must have thought about the situation and chosen the morally right action (Beach, 1952).  
Theology as Contemplation 
The creation of a new social order reliant upon the justice of God was argued for 
by Tyndale (2000/1528). While he did not believe in the usurpation of the divinely 
ordained rulers, he did believe in a civil disobedience that refused to acquiesce to 
injustice. His thinking and reflection about God led him to take moral actions regardless 
of the temporal law. For the Christian, critical thinking was expected. Protestant theology 
considered human rationality to separate humankind from other creatures (Beach, 1952). 
Kantian ethicists misconstrued the abusive records of many churches and nations, 
operating under the name of Christianity, to be, in fact, Christianity (Ferre, 1951). The 
reality, however, was that Christianity theology consisted of a far more autonomous and 
principled ethical system. Still, it would be going too far to link Christian ethics with the 
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strict humanism of Kant. Ferre’s view of Christian theology informed a far more 
balanced ethic of freedom, one balanced by an authority that enlivened freedom.  
The simplest way to exhibit this relationship between authority and autonomy in 
the Christian faith is to define the nature of Christian authority…. We Christians 
have no magic book to be used indiscriminately, unintelligently, and woodenly. 
Such an authority would indeed make us guilty of heteronomous ethics…! Nor do 
we accept the decrees of an infallible human institution with the keys to bind the 
consciences of men…. If any organization of men could decree for other men 
what their eternal obligation is and substitute such decrees for people’s own moral 
insight and conscience, we certainly should have a damaging moral 
heteronomy…. The nature of Christian authority is, rather, the love of God in 
Christ Jesus…. Christian love by its very nature bestows freedom on the objects 
of its love. God is not concerned with the manufacture of puppets but with the 
maturing of children…. Not only is this authority thus not inconsistent with 
freedom, but, in fact, agape as authority expresses its very self by the creation and 
the fostering of such freedom. In this sense, then, authority and autonomy both 
coincide and reinforce each other…. Christian authority is of such a nature as to 
effect autonomy. Therefore the distinction between the two concepts is false…. 
(pp. 249-250) 
 
Waltke (1995) similarly argued for a moral theonomy based on the individual’s 
“sound judgment,” used in conjunction with the Bible and the Holy Spirit (p. 143). The 
Christian use of rationality, however, was preceded by an understanding that “God’s 
Word is certain; human reason is less certain” (p. 145). Therefore, the Christian did not 
disregard the Bible. The Christian used reason to apply biblical principles. 
Most secular philosophy scholars misconstrued Kant to be more antagonistic to 
religion than was warranted by his writings (Hare, 2001). According to Hare, Kant did 
not argue moral laws were entirely self-created. Instead, Kant sought to find a way in 
which moral law was not homocentric or theocentric but was eternally pre-existent with 
God. Through such a philosophy, Kant’s appeals to moral law were not appeals to man-
made law or God-made law but simply to law.  
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Kant believes that autonomy is not only consistent with submission to political 
authority, but requires that submission. His argument is that coercion by the state 
is necessary in order to prevent coercion by individuals…. External compulsion 
by the state is thus ‘a hindering of the hindrances to freedom…. It is only within a 
civil condition , where there is a legislator to enact laws, an executive to enforce 
them, and a judiciary to settle disputes about rights by reference to such public 
laws, that human beings can do what it can be known a priori they must be able to 
do in accordance with moral principles….’ A citizen is in this way morally 
justified in adopting into her own will the will of the ruler. The analogy with 
God’s rule is systematic…. God can punish and reward us. As we have already 
seen, this is not supposed to be the ground for our obedience. But it is essentially 
tied to the way in which God can be the author of the obligation to obey the law 
in a way that we are not. (pp. 109-110) 
Baptist Individualism 
 According to Shurden (1998), the foundation for a distinction of Baptists was the 
consistent focus on liberty and conscience. Baptists were among the most individualistic 
denominations and pioneers in the concept of democracy (Harkness, 1939). Shurden 
traced Baptist beliefs in individualism and freedom of conscience back to the 1600s, a 
century before Kant. 
While there has been a long academic and historical attempt to define Baptists, 
there were certain distinctions marking Baptist theology. One such distinction was 
religious autonomy. “For Baptists, private interpretation of Scripture is not a post-
Enlightenment appropriation of democratic individualism and egalitarianism; it is part of 
their earliest seventeenth-century heritage” (Shurden, 1998, paragraph 20). John Leland, 
an 18th century Baptist, considered conscience to be fallible because humans did not 
always have the information necessary for rational decisions. Still, he believed a free 
conscience was far superior to government law (Moore, 1965). Williams, a 17th century 
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Baptist, was the first English writer to firmly set forth a principled claim for freedom of 
conscience and the first political leader to establish a system for the absolute protection of 
freedom of conscience (Noonan, 1987). 
Baptists and Principled Morality 
Baptists were early pioneers of human rights and had always emphasized issues of 
justice and freedom. A major difference between Baptist principles of human rights and 
humanistic principles, however, was that Baptists based their principles on theology, not 
sociology (Shurden, 1998). Baptists were arguing for extensive human rights (see 
Helwys, 1997/1612) decades before Hobbes (1997/1651), who was a forerunner of liberal 
humanism, was even arguing for the most basic right to life. According to Shurden: 
What distinguished early Baptists was the conviction that all human beings, 
redeemed or not, have a God-given freedom to follow conscience in matters 
spiritual and religion. Early Baptists, as did other Christians of their time, 
assumed that freedom for living fully, authentically, and genuinely was found in 
Christ. Where Baptists differed with their culture was believing that people had as 
a gift from God the right to choose that path. Freedom came with creation, as well 
as redemption…. The origin of human rights is not found in the rationalism and 
individualism of the Enlightenment but in the free churches at the time of the 
Puritan Revolution. (paragraph 48) 
 
The religious and political actions of Williams served as a prime example of early 
Baptist principles. Williams founded Rhode Island as the first government in the world to 
grant absolute freedom of conscience to all its residents. He specified Rhode Island’s 
freedom would be available to all, including Jews, Muslims and atheists (Harkness, 
1939). While modern democracy was theoretically rooted in Enlightenment philosophy, 
the Enlightenment philosophy was rooted in Calvinist theology. Although Williams 
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thought Quakers heretics, he ensured them absolute freedom of conscience within Rhode 
Island. Rather than use political power against those he considered heretics, he used 
preaching and writing in an attempt to show their errors (Moore, 1965). 
To a great extent, modern political democracy was created by Williams 
(Harkness, 1939). Williams’ writings on freedom of conscience were influential to the 
development of John Locke, who became a pivotal inspiration for the American 
Revolution (Moore, 1965). Williams recognized that the specific formation of a 
government system was somewhat arbitrary, that numerous types of systems existed 
throughout the world, and that many successful governments had existed in non-Christian 
nations. Still, within the range of options available, Williams insisted a government’s 
legitimacy grew from the sanction of the citizens not any divine right granted to 
autocrats. Therefore, Williams outlined a legitimate rationale for revolution, based on the 
will of the people, more than a century before the US Declaration of Independence made 
a similar assertion (Harkness). 
Williams argued the purpose of government was to preserve the natural freedom 
of each individual from the dangers of the state of nature, where everyone was free yet 
felt no security because he or she could be abused by anyone stronger (Harkness, 1939). 
Williams was outlining a liberal political philosophy well before Hobbes (1997/1612) 
challenged divine right and theorized the state of nature. The political and philosophical 
advances of Williams, according to Moore (1965), made it easy for many to categorize 
him as “an Enlightened secular liberal,” or “as primarily a political thinker,” (p. 58), but 
Williams was first and foremost a Puritan clergyman. As Moore stated, “Williams 
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was…distinguished from other New England Calvinists only by the consistency with 
which he carried to conclusion some of the implications of assumptions common to them 
all” (p. 58). 
Authority and Autonomy in Baptist Theology 
According to Cullen (1998), the medieval church made the error of presenting 
their doctrine as the infallible rule, and thus creating an idol. In contrast, the 
Enlightenment thinkers made their own understanding the infallible rule, creating a 
different idol. Cullen argued, however, that Christian theology required both doctrine and 
rationality to serve as tools for interpreting the actual infallible tool, the Bible. Protestants 
held a tension between biblical authority and personal religious autonomy (Beach, 1952). 
Rationalism insisted people could not turn to external inspiration for moral 
conviction and that people must have sought their own realization above all else. 
Rationalists, such as Kant, misunderstood the concept of theological authority, however. 
According to Beach (1952), Christians believed theological commitment was so 
internalized that it was an internal source of wisdom.  
For when the self really acknowledges the sovereignty of God over him, that 
acknowledgement is an inward appropriation so intense that the self no longer 
feels the authority to be something ‘over against’ him, something hostile to his 
true self, but rather the expression of his true self. The authority now compels him 
from within, not from without. (p. 111) 
 
Christianity was not a religion of prescription. It was a religion of incredible 
thought and purpose in decision making. Beach (1952) and Waltke (1995) asserted 
Christians enjoyed tremendous latitude of morally right action within their daily lives. 
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Augustine described Christian moral action thusly, “Love God and do what you want” (as 
cited in Beach, p. 110). 
While Catholic theology instituted the Church hierarchy as a source for absolute, 
trustworthy truth, Protestants had no such authority outside the Bible. Protestants had no 
chair from which a pope could proclaim ex cathedra. Protestants had no Catechism to 
interpret and apply the Bible for them. Protestants must have individually and 
collectively grappled with issues and hermeneutics. Beach (1952) described the 
Catholic/Protestant dichotomy as one of a difference of religious authority. “It is 
precisely the Protestant genius…to criticize under the Judgment of God, the finality of 
any finite authority as representing exhaustively the authority of the Infinite” (p. 112). 
Protestants welcomed reason into the moral debate. Still, Protestants treated reason 
differently than the rationalists. “Reason has an authoritative role. But it was a secondary 
role, to illumine the witness of the Word when the words were dark or obscure” (p. 113). 
According to Kohlberg (1966), stage 6 thinkers used their “conscience as a 
directing agent” (p. 7). This was within the theological concepts of Waltke (1995) and 
Packer (1993). The role of conscience was integral to biblical morality.  
Christian Education 
Southern Baptists have traditionally placed great importance on education, 
especially higher education. In fact, the Baptist Faith and Message, which outlined the 
general beliefs of Southern Baptists, included an article on the establishment of a system 
of higher education. Hobbs (1971), one of the 20th century’s most influential Baptist 
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leaders, was instrumental in formulating the Baptist Faith and Message. According to 
Hobbs, “Since all social injustice is rooted in sin in the human heart, efforts for 
improving the social order and establishing righteousness must begin in the regeneration 
of the individual person” (p. 129). Clearly, Southern Baptists were concerned with 
education and social justice.  
While Baptists had been significantly involved in higher education, they also had 
an historical commitment to education in churches. Moral development was a central 
focus in both realms of education. Dockery (2000), as the president of a Southern Baptist 
college, had suggested Christian higher education must be committed to moral 
development and that cognitive development was a significant factor in moral 
development. Tidwell (1996), who was a leading scholar in the study of church 
education, argued the educational mission of a church relied on the proper critical 
thinking of Christians. Baptist churches and Baptist colleges were expected to encourage 
Christians to think critically and question their faith as a means of developing more 
mature faith.  
Baptists were involved in American higher education from an early stage. 
Baptists, and particularly Southern Baptists, had a rich tradition in higher education, 
having founded many of America’s great schools such as Brown, George Washington, 
Mercy and Baylor Universities. In fact, Brown University was uniquely Baptist among 
the early American universities. The Baptist theology of individual liberty led Brown to 
hold “the most liberal character” of the Ivy League schools. Brown was also noteworthy 
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in that “all members [of its community] were to enjoy full, free, absolute, and 
uninterrupted liberty of conscience” (Johnson, 1955, p. 5).  
According to Johnson (1955), Baptist colleges were also especially focused on the 
moral development of students. “The main purpose in the [biblical] educational 
philosophy…[was] the development of noble individual character, the motivating force in 
Christian men and women who, in consequence, would stand for and promote social 
justice. Christian educators today proclaim that same purpose” (Johnson, 1955, p. 1). 
Johnson discussed social justice as an outcome of education prior to Kohlberg’s or 
Rawls’s work.  
 The research of Kohlberg and Fowler was used by Cullen (1998) to outline the 
necessity of critical reflection in the moral and spiritual development of Christians. Such 
an educational pedagogy was intended to holistically develop the Christian student. 
Christians, according to Cullen, were obligated to earnestly think about and evaluate their 
faith. 
The primary functions of Christian education, according to Tidwell (1996), were 
to promote Christian involvement in issues of social justice. If the church was to teach 
principles of moral conduct, social justice, and critical thinking, Kohlberg’s theory and 
the DIT should be significantly related to the church’s mission. One reason so many 
researchers have found lower reasoning in some Christian populations may be the failure 
of some religious education. Schultz and Schultz (1996) believed one problem with 
church education was a frequent absence of attention to critical thinking despite 
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understanding that critical thinking was essential to fulfillment of the church’s 
educational mission. 
In a survey by Hoge et al. (1982), religious educators and Christian parents were 
asked about their foci in church curriculum development. Baptist educators agreed “the 
main goals of Christian education” include promoting “justice in the local community” 
(pp. 233-234). Baptist educators ranked “justice” higher than educators from Church of 
God, Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal and Catholic churches. Only Methodist parents 
ranked “justice” higher than Baptist parents. Hoge et al. showed tremendous support for 
social, political and critical thinking in church education among Baptist parents and 
educators. 
Despite high interest in justice, Baptists ranked the educational goals, “the 
struggle for justice is a rightful concern of the church,” and “shows concern about 
liberation of oppressed people,” lower than members of any of the other denominations. 
Baptists were also lowest ranking the statements, “willing to work publicly to protest 
social wrongs” and in “appreciates his or her personal responsibility as a Christian for 
combating social evils” (Hoge et al., 1982, pp. 233-234). 
In critical thinking statements, both Baptist parents and educators ranked the goal 
of “evaluate the different claims” of other faiths higher than people of other 
denominations (Hoge et al., 1982, p. 234). Baptist educators were second (insignificantly 
behind Episcopalians) on the statement, “understands Christianity both from within his or 
her own tradition and also critically, as if from outside.” Baptist parents were highest on 
that statement of critical thinking. Baptist educators were highest in “responsible view 
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toward moral questions.” Both Baptist educators and parents were highest in “values the 
Bible as inspiration for personal spiritual growth,” “can identify important assumptions 
and implications of Christian teachings,” and “distinguishes between the values of culture 
and the values of the Gospel” (pp. 234-235). Baptists ranked “reflective understanding” 
of their faith and “moral maturity” higher than any denomination (p. 238). 
A key to understanding these differences was found in what members of 
denominations ranked as most important. Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal and 
Catholic educators ranked “has a healthy self-concept” higher than any other goal. 
Conversely, Baptist educators ranked “has a personal relationship with Jesus Christ” as 
the primary goal (Hoge et al., 1982, p. 236). 
Baptists ranked statements regarding broad moral principles such as justice higher 
than other denominations. When the questions concerned social action, however, Baptists 
ranked the statements lower than did members of mainline denominations. A possible 
explanation is the obvious connotation of such action with the liberalism of the 1960s and 
1970s. In broad terms, Baptists considered social issues and religious critical thinking 
extremely important. When asked whether Christian youth should be encouraged to 
march in local protests, however, the Baptists were not as supportive (Hoge et al., 1982). 
Baptists believed social injustice should be fought by the church, but likely did 
not want their churches to become the liberal bastions other denominations had become 
since the 1970s. The distinction in mission was exemplified by the evangelical focus on 
conversion and the mainline focus on self-esteem. Liberal denominations ranked goals of 
Unitarianism and theological uncertainty as being supremely important. Religious 
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conviction and morality were most important to Southern Baptists, and to a lesser extent 
Church of God members. Taken as a whole, the results of the study supported the 
contention that Southern Baptist religious educators and parents take issues of justice and 
critical thinking more seriously than do members of the other five denominations.  
According to Stubblefield (1993), “Spiritual maturity includes the ability to make 
ethical and moral decisions in keeping with the Christian faith” (p. 168). Reinsmith 
(1995) argued Christians were obligated to think critically about their faith so as to 
separate false doctrines from those that could be carried forward. Even then, Christians 
were to maintain a “healthy doubt” which would lead to the development rather than 
destruction of faith. Baptists were believers in absolute, universal principles and in the 
importance of critical reflection and social justice. These values and practices of Baptists 
were well aligned with the theoretical foundations of Kohlberg and Rest.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
In 1995, the federal government cut Higher Education Act funding for educational 
rehabilitation programs. The warden at Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP), Burl Cain, 
began thinking of new ways to educate the prisoners (Frink, 2004). Cain partnered with 
the Judson Baptist Association, Louisiana Baptist Convention, and the New Orleans 
Baptist Theological Seminary (NOBTS) to bring a privately funded theological education 
to the prison (Baker, 2000).  
NOBTS and LSP created a college program offering associate and bachelor’s 
degrees to prison inmates. The prison college opened in 1995, awarded its first associate 
degrees in 1998 and its first bachelor’s degrees in 2000 (Louisiana Department of Public 
Safety and Corrections, 2000). In 2004, LSP was the only prison in the United States 
offering bachelor’s degrees to inmates (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and 
Corrections, 2000; 2001). The LSP campus of NOBTS was one of 17 NOBTS extension 
centers and was regionally accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Schools (Frink, 2002; Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2001) 
A primary goal of the Seminary was the moral development of students. Warden 
Cain had said, “I wish other prison wardens could realize what we learned—that the only 
rehabilitation is moral rehabilitation” (Frink, 2004, p. 39). Robert Toney, a chaplain at 
Angola, had also emphasized the moral nature of the Seminary program in his statement 
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“Moral rehabilitation is the only rehabilitation that works. If you just have education, 
what you have done is just created a smarter criminal. The change must come from 
within” (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108). 
Cain viewed faith-based efforts as the most promising development in criminal 
rehabilitation. He has said “nothing else but [the religious programs] should get the credit 
[for Angola’s change]. We always had the educational programs. The only thing we did 
different was we brought God to Angola” (Frink, 2004, p. 39). The program was 
considered such a success in 2004 that wardens from prisons in other states were asking 
NOBTS to consider opening campuses at their prisons (Myers, 2004). NOBTS 
subsequently opened a new campus at the Mississippi State Penitentiary and the 
Seminary was developing programs in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama (Myers, 2005).  
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary 
at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP). Specifically, this study was designed to 
evaluate the program’s effect on the moral development of students at LSP. An attempt 
was made to include a census of all students in the LSP Seminary population. 
The evaluation of the Seminary at LSP was important as various national policies 
continued to emphasize faith-based initiatives, while other policies led to America 
imprisoning a higher ratio of its population than any other nation in the world (Mauer, 
2003). The study of moral development was a salient issue to the American public, as 
well (Rest et al., 1999). From the frames of higher education, political science and 
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criminal justice scholarship, this program evaluation was thought to be potentially helpful 
to researchers, administrators, policy makers and bureaucrats in making more informed 
and effective decisions. This evaluation could also serve social scientists and 
philosophers in terms of advancing their understanding of the social, psychological and 
spiritual development of human beings. 
Despite the relevance of this program to so many fields of scholarship, no  
previously published studies concerning the Seminary at LSP were located during the 
review of the literature and related research. Searches were conducted through a variety 
of databases, including Dissertation Abstracts, ERIC, Professional Development 
Collection and Academic Search Premier. This program evaluation stood to fill an 
important gap in scholarship. 
Primary Research Question 
To what extent do students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral 
judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for 
effective ministry? 
Research Question 1a 
What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral judgment of 
freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary students? 
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Research Question 1b 
What, if any, statistically significant relationships exist between the moral 
judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types? 
Population and Sample 
The LSP Seminary program enrolled 101 students in the fall 2005 semester. 
Because the population was relatively small and the measurement instruments allowed 
groups to be evaluated at reasonable costs, the entire program population was invited to 
participate in the study. The DIT-1 and DIT-2 required moderate reading levels (Rest et 
al., 2000). Consequently, the use of a control group was determined to be impractical. 
Appropriate reading levels could not be assured for any random group of prisoners 
outside the college program. 
While an attempt was made to include a census of the population, all participants 
were informed of their rights, including the right to not participate. Particular attention 
was made to practice informed consent consistent with the Common Rule subsection on 
research involving prisoners (45 CFR 46, subpart C).  
In addition to the involvement of the program population, additional data were 
gathered from the full-time faculty of NOBTS. The data gathered from the faculty were 
used in conjunction with program population data for the purpose of better addressing the 
overall research question posed in this study. Faculty data served as a benchmark for 
student moral development.  
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The original plan for the program evaluation included a census of the 66 full-time 
NOBTS main campus faculty. The faculty members were to be provided research 
materials, including informed consent, during one of their periodic faculty meetings. In 
September 2005, however, Hurricane Katrina caused the evacuation of the main campus 
and the dispersing of the Seminary faculty.  
The Seminary administration, comprised of 15 faculty members who concurrently 
held administrative roles in the Seminary, moved temporarily to Atlanta, GA. Those 15 
faculty members were asked to participate in this evaluation. An additional 15 non-
administrative faculty members were randomly selected and asked to participate. The 
inclusion of faculty was chosen for three primary reasons. First, the lack of a control 
group limited the conclusions made from this study. A benchmark group was not the 
same as a control group, but provided some external measure. Second, Kohlberg found 
the moral reasoning of teachers directly impacted the moral development of students 
(Bar-Yam et al., 1980). An evaluation of faculty moral reasoning served to ascertain what 
level of moral reasoning was consistent with the program’s intended outcomes. The third 
rationale for including faculty followed from the second rationale. An evaluation of the 
moral reasoning of faculty was sought to validate the DIT-2 for this study.  
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Instrumentation 
Defining Issues Test 2 
The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) was used as the measurement instrument for 
moral judgment. The DIT-2 was a paper-and-pencil instrument, which could be 
completed in approximately 45 minutes. The instrument involved five moral dilemmas 
presented as stories. The participant read each story and then categorized 12 statements as 
to their moral relevance for the dilemma. The DIT-2 was computer scored by the Center 
for the Study of Ethical Development. 
The theoretical framework of the DIT and DIT-2 was presented as part of the 
review of the literature. In brief, the instrument was developed by Rest (1986) based upon 
Kohlberg’s (1981) theory of moral development. The DIT and DIT-2 were intended to 
provide quantitative scores for the moral judgment of participants. 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) instrument Form F was used to asses 
the personality types of participants. The MBTI instrument was a paper-and-pencil, 
multiple-choice instrument. Form F of the MBTI was a longer form, involving 166 items 
and was designed for use by researchers. Use of Form F was restricted to researchers 
authorized by the Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT). CAPT 
authorized the researcher for this program evaluation to use Form F. 
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The MBTI’s theoretical framework and relevant research were also discussed as 
part of the literature review. Based on the work of Jung, the MBTI instrument was 
developed by Myers and Briggs. The results of MBTI assessments included four general 
categories of personality with each category including two dichotomies. Participants were 
identified with one of the two dichotomies in each category.  
Instrument Reliability and Validity 
DIT Reliability and Validity 
Rest (1986) believed the evidence for a cognitive theory of moral development 
was so strong that, “if a person remains skeptical on the point that there are age trends in 
moral judgment, it is doubtful that any finding in all of social science will be acceptable” 
(pp. 29, 32). One of the fundamental validity traits in Kohlberg’s theory was that 
numerous studies had shown stage-progression was age-related. Similarly, early research 
of the DIT supported its ability to measure moral development as a factor of cognitive 
maturation. According to Rest (1986), “age/education accounts for 30 to 50 percent of the 
variance in DIT scores” (p. 176). So, the general theory of a cognitive basis for moral 
development was well supported. 
Researchers had found the DIT was sufficiently reliable with reliability 
coefficients usually in the .70s and .80s (Rest et al., 2000). The DIT had an internal 
reliability, using Chronbach’s alpha, of .76, while the shorter DIT-2 increased reliability 
to .81. Combining the DIT and DIT-2 increased reliability to .90 but did not yield 
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significantly different results (Rest et al., 1999). The reliability of the DIT and DIT-2 
were based upon hundreds of thousands of administrations. The DIT and the DIT-2 
correlated extremely well with each other (Rest et al., 1999). 
The DIT had been validated in terms of cognitive measurement, longitudinal 
consistency, age and educational discrimination, reliability and other measures of 
professional ethics and social issues through more than 400 studies. Still, the publisher of 
the DIT was seeking to gather more data, especially data pertaining to demographic 
groups most salient to the DIT construction and theory (Rest et al., 1999). Because this 
study concerned the professional preparation of clergy, this research had the potential to 
make a valuable contribution to the research literature.  
According to Rest (1986), a large percentage of studies involving the DIT used 
small sample sizes and often involved no more than a couple dozen participants (Rest, 
1986). Literature reviewed for this dissertation included numerous studies with small 
sample sizes. Many of the studies included similar, and sometimes smaller, sample sizes 
than the number participants surveyed in this research (Ang, 1989; Blizard, 1980; Catoe, 
1992; Faqua, 1983; Griffore & Samuels, 1978; Leland, 1990; Nelson, 2004; Watt et al., 
2000). Some studies used negligibly larger sample sizes (Hoagland, 1984; Walters, 1980; 
Warren, 1992; Washington, 1999). 
This study involved a population of 101 students. The size of the population was 
appropriate for the DIT instrument and yielded reliable and valid statistics. The literature 
review conducted for this study demonstrated the theoretical validity of the DIT-2 for this 
particular evaluation.  
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The DIT had been used with Christian populations in numerous studies. Quite 
often, Christian populations scored at approximately the national average. Many other 
studies had shown Christians to score below average. Christian education, however, was 
intended to develop the critical thinking skills consistent with principled reasoning on the 
DIT. The DIT was not a perfect measure of Christian morality, as it was not designed for 
Christians; however, the DIT did meet the validity requirements for this program 
evaluation. Further, the DIT was determined to be the most appropriate measure available 
for this research. 
MBTI Reliability and Validity 
The MBTI instrument was a time-tested instrument with high reliability and 
validity. Internal reliability coefficients for middle-aged adults exceeded .90 for each of 
the four dichotomies. Test-retest reliabilities were lower but still ranged from the low 
.60s to low .80s. The psychological nature of the MBTI caused the instrument to be 
susceptible to variations based upon testing conditions (Myers et al., 2003).  
The validity of MBTI assessments had been evaluated by comparison with other 
psychological measures. For example, the MBTI dichotomies correlated modestly with 
corresponding dynamics of the 16 Personality Factors Questionnaire, the California 
Psychological Inventory, and the Strong Interest Inventory (Myers et al., 2003).  
The MBTI instrument, like the DIT-2, was theoretically based on an assumption 
of universal applicability. Further, the MBTI instrument could not report negative results. 
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No score on an MBTI report should have been construed as a bad or poor score. All 
preferences were considered healthy aspects of human personality (Myers et al., 2003). 
Despite the presumption of all types being equal, there were researchers who had 
indicated type differences in moral reasoning; however, these findings actually supported 
the validity of both the MBTI and the DIT for this program evaluation. Type differences 
in moral reasoning largely fit what researchers might logically conclude based upon type 
and moral stage descriptions.  
The type differences in moral reasoning bore significance on the interpretation of 
results for this study. The literature supported a hypothesis that Introvert (I), Sensing (S), 
Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences would be overrepresented among LSP Seminary 
students. The S, F and J preferences were predictive of lower moral reasoning scores. The 
tendency of these types to predict lower moral reasoning did not, however, negate the use 
of the DIT for this population. Instead, understanding these types allowed better type-
appropriate interpretation of DIT scores.  
Data Collection 
Students in the LSP Seminary program received letters inviting them to 
participate in this study. The letters provided informed consent and requested their 
signatures indicating whether they did or did not agree to participate. Those students who 
agreed to participate completed the DIT-2 and MBTI in a classroom setting at Angola. 
Researchers including prisoners as participants needed to be especially conscious of the 
particular requirements of Common Rule subpart C. To ensure LSP Seminary students 
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did not feel any undue pressure to participate in this study, those students who attended 
received informed consent in written form and verbally from the researcher prior to their 
completing of the research instruments. LSP guards were not in the classroom during the 
research process. 
Each participant received an envelope containing the DIT-2 and the MBTI. Each 
envelope was marked with a particular participant’s name. The instruments, however, 
were only marked with the student’s unique identification number created by the 
researcher for this program evaluation. When participants completed the instruments, the 
DIT-2, the MBTI, and the envelopes were each returned separately to the researcher. This 
method ensured anonymity. Individual students were known only to the researcher; once 
documents were returned to the researcher, they were placed in a bag that did not leave 
the researcher’s possession at any time in LSP. 
The research involving the full-time faculty at the NOBTS main campus was 
conducted in accordance with informed consent. To obtain participation from those 
faculty members in Atlanta, the researcher delivered the materials to the offices of the 
faculty members. The faculty members were requested to complete the DIT-2 and return 
the instruments by mail to the researcher. Stamped, addressed envelopes were provided to 
each faculty member. The Seminary was not able to provide mailing addresses of those 
faculty members not in Atlanta. The researcher, in requesting participation, e-mailed 
informed consent information to the 15 randomly selected faculty members. Faculty 
members who agreed to participate voluntarily provided current mailing addresses. 
Materials, including informed consent letters, were then mailed to participating faculty. 
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Data Analysis 
The Primary Research Question posed in this study was focused on the extent to 
which students in the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with 
program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. The 
question was designed to allow holistic analysis appropriate to this unique faith-based 
program evaluation. The analysis for this question was dependent upon answers to the 
two sub-questions, Research Question 1a and Research Question 1b. 
Research Question 1a inquired as to any statistically significant differences in the 
moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level LSP Seminary students. 
Data obtained from the DIT-2 P scores and demographic information from the DIT-2 
were analyzed. The Center for the Study of Ethical Development provided results in an 
SPSS file. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to investigate differences in 
dependent variables and the independent variable. Statistical significance was calculated 
based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5 percent. 
 Research Question 1b addressed any statistically significant relationships 
identified between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality 
types. Data obtained from the DIT-2 and MBTI were used in the analysis. Moral 
judgment was categorized by P scores. Personality type variables included each of the 
eight individual dichotomy designations (I, E, S, N, T, F, J and P), the 16 personality 
types (e.g., INTP), the 4 personality temperaments (SJ, SP, NT and NF) and Richardson’s 
(1996) four spiritualities (NF, NT, SF and ST). ANOVAs were used to investigate 
differences in the dependent variable and the independent variables. Statistical 
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significance was calculated based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5 
percent. 
 The literature reviewed relevant to this program evaluation was limited in 
significant areas of content. Little research was available concerning the moral 
development of prisoners or the moral development of Baptist seminarians. While 
questions of statistical significance could be determined quantitatively, program success 
had not been similarly defined. 
An evaluation of the program’s effectiveness in facilitating moral development 
necessitated consideration of initial moral judgment and the moral judgment of exiting 
students, as well as the general progress shown across each year of schooling. 
Additionally, an evaluation of the moral development of students included the assessment 
of growth respective to personality. Finally, this program evaluation necessitated 
consideration of what moral judgment was reasonable and appropriate for this population. 
The results of faculty evaluations facilitated creating a benchmark for what moral 
judgments were consistent with Baptist theology.  
Summary 
The LSP Seminary program had existed for a decade and had been credited with 
substantial success in the reform of the Angola environment. The program model was 
expanding across the state of Louisiana and was now being incorporated into the 
correctional programs of other states. No research had been conducted, however, to 
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evaluate this program. The purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate the LSP 
Seminary’s success in facilitating moral development of students.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
 This study was conducted during fall of 2005 in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the LSP Seminary program in achieving the goal of moral development 
among students. Students were asked to complete the DIT-2 and MBTI instruments, and 
30 NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2.  
The LSP Seminary population consisted of 101 students. Of the 101 students in 
the program, 95 agreed to complete the DIT-2, for a response rate of 94%, and 98 
completed the MBTI instrument, for a response rate of 97%. In addition to the student 
responses, 30 full-time NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2. The 
contacted faculty members included 15 administrators who held faculty rank and 15 non-
administrative professors. Of the 15 administrative faculty members, four agreed to 
participate, for a response rate of 27%. Of the 15 randomly selected non-administrative 
faculty members, 2 agreed to participate, for a response rate of 13%. These responses 
represented 9% of the total NOBTS full-time faculty.  
Response rates for faculty members were low, overall. Because the faculty 
member data were to be used only for benchmarking, the response rates were deemed 
sufficient for this evaluation. The low response rates might be attributable to the time 
requirements of the DIT-2 and the stressors undoubtedly facing faculty members still 
recovering from Hurricane Katrina.  
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Research Questions 
The data from the survey instruments were collected and analyzed to answer a 
single Primary Research Question, which was focused on the extent to which students in 
the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of 
rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. Analysis of the data 
gathered to respond to the two sub-questions, Research Question 1a and Research 
Question 1b, formed the basis for answering the primary question. The following sections 
provide narratives and tabular displays for each of the research sub-questions, which 
enable a response to the Primary Research Question. 
Research Question 1a 
 What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral judgment of 
freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary students? 
 
To answer this question, the DIT-2 was administered to students who agreed to 
participate in this study. The dependent variables investigated were the DIT-2 P scores 
and stage scores. The independent variable was the individual student’s class year. 
 The DIT-2 included an overall P score, as well as scores for the individual’s 
likelihood of preferring choices at each of the two lower stages. Stage23 represented 
choices based on self-interests. Stage4 represented choices based upon maintaining social 
norms. A successful program would ideally increase P scores across time and decrease 
Stage23 scores across time. Successful changes in Stage4 scores would be factors for 
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students’ levels as they began the program, because Stage4 is a transitory stage between 
Stage23 and principled thinking, represented by the P scores.  
 The DIT-2 included several internal reliability controls. In test administrations, it 
was common for 10% or more of the respondents to be disqualified due to internal 
reliability checks (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). In this administration, a mere 3% of 
respondents were disqualified from the final data due to internal consistency checks. A 
final sample size of 92 respondents was included in the analysis of the DIT-2 data, 
representing 91% of the entire population and 97% of the participating students. The 
independent variable scores for the 92 reported students are shown in Table 5.  
 To answer Research Question 1a, ANOVAs were conducted for the independent 
and dependent variables. The analysis did not achieve statistical significance for any of 
the dependent variables. The results for P scores were F(3,88) = 1.2, p >.05; for Stage23 
were F(3,88) = 1.0, p > .05; and for Stage4 were F(3,88) = 0.62, p > .05. Results of 
ANOVAs did not support the rejection of the null hypothesis. Results of the analysis of 
variance for the independent and dependent variables are reported in Table 6. 
A visual check of the mean scores revealed an apparent change in scores across 
the four years of college. The changes in scores, however, did not achieve statistical 
significance. One possible reason for the lack of significance may be wide variances in P 
scores. The variances of scores for each class are shown in Table 7. The variances in 
freshmen scores were much greater than were the variances in the other years.  
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Table 5  
Independent Variable Scores for Participating Students by Class Year (N = 92) 
Independent Variables N                        m                 sd 
Freshmen    
P Score 
Stage23 
Stage4 
33
33
33
24.5609 
26.2012 
43.3476 
15.14261
13.01753
16.67556
Sophomores  
P Score 
Stage23 
Stage4 
12
12
12
25.5250 
22.1883 
49.7875 
9.06834
9.91914
10.10383
Juniors  
P Score 
Stage23 
Stage4 
25
25
25
30.2744 
22.0032 
44.0424 
13.16482
10.74928
12.22368
Seniors  
P Score 
Stage23 
Stage4 
22
22
22
29.2273 
21.2955 
45.3864 
9.84611
13.09185
15.34363
Total  
P Score 
Stage23 
Stage4 
92
92
92
27.3551 
23.3639 
44.8639 
12.84973
12.08941
14.42715
 
 
 
Table 6  
Anova Results for the Independent and Dependent Variables 
Variables Variance SS       df    Mean square      F           Sig. 
P score Between 588.007 3 196.002 1.195 .317
 Within 14437.501 88 164.063    
 Total  15025.508 91      
Stage23 Between 422.659 3 140.886 .963 .414
 Within 12877.331 88 146.333    
 Total  13299.990 91      
Stage4 Between 389.654 3 129.885 .616 .606
 Within 18551.339 88 210.811    
 Total  18940.993 91      
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Table 7  
Minimum, Maximum and Range of Participants’ Scores by Class Year (N = 92) 
Class Year Range P Score Stage23 Stage4
Freshmen Minimum .00 .00 16.00
 Maximum 66.00 48.00 74.47
 Range 66.00 48.00 58.47
Sophomores Minimum 8.00 4.26 38.00
 Maximum 38.30 38.00 68.00
 Range 30.30 33.74 30.00
Juniors Minimum 8.00 4.08 22.00
 Maximum 54.00 40.00 66.00
 Range 46.00 35.92 44.00
Seniors Minimum 10.00 6.00 20.00
 Maximum 48.00 48.00 70.00
 Range 38.00 42.00 50.00
 
 The program evaluator chose to test for statistical outliers to determine if the 
variances may have affected statistical significance. This exploration of data was chosen 
after the initial tests came close to statistical significance, but did not achieve 
significance. SPSS was used to test for outliers, and two outliers were found in the P 
scores of the freshmen students. No outliers were found among the other stage scores. 
The two freshmen outliers had P scores of 66 and 58. Those P scores would have been 
very high scores among the general public and represented the two highest scores in the 
entire LSP Seminary sample. These scores approximated those found among students in 
theologically liberal seminaries (m = 57.6) and moral philosophy graduate students (m = 
64.4) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). 
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 Outliers, by definition, skew the results of research. The outliers in this research 
posed a particular problem for evaluation because they were similar to scores of graduate 
students. An undergraduate program is unlikely to significantly improve the moral 
reasoning of such students; therefore, the program evaluator chose to conduct ANOVAs 
with the two outliers removed from the sample. Table 8 displays the comparison of P 
Scores with outliers included and excluded. 
 
Table 8  
P Scores: Freshmen and All Participating Students by Class Year 
P Scores N                        m                 sd 
Freshmen    
P Score with outliers 
P Score without outliers 
 
33
31
24.5609 
22.1455 
15.14261
12.00184
  
Total  
P Score with outliers 
P Score without outliers 
92
90
27.3551 
26.5852 
12.84973
11.86991
 
 
 Removing the outliers and conducting an analysis of variance of the remaining P 
scores resulted in the achievement of statistical significance, F(3,86) = 2.8, p < .05. The 
results of the ANOVA are reported in Table 9. With the outliers removed, a statistically 
significant difference was found among P scores across the four years of college. A 
Tukey post-hoc comparison was conducted.  It was determined the differences existed 
between the freshmen and junior class years (p < .05).  
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Table 9  
Analysis of Variance with Outliers Removed (N = 90) 
Variance              SS df Mean Square           F Sig.
Between  1118.359 3 372.786 2.807 .044
Within 11421.267 86 132.805    
Total 12539.626 89     
 
 In response to Research Question 1a, statistical significance was not found among 
the data. Although overall significance was not found, an after-the-fact analysis 
suggested that significant differences in P scores might be found if outliers were removed 
from the sample. The differences in P scores appeared between the freshman and junior 
class years.  
 No statistically significant differences were found in the Stage23 or Stage4 scores 
of the Seminary population. A trend of differing scores was observed, however. 
Sophomores used Stage23 much less often than freshmen, while sophomores used Stage4 
more frequently than freshmen. The more frequent use of Stage4 for sophomores was 
consistent with the less frequent use of Stage23. Juniors used Stage4  less frequently than 
sophomores. This would be required for continued growth in principled thinking. In total, 
mean scores showed inclinations toward Stage23 in the freshman year, Stage4 in the 
sophomore year, and principled thinking in the junior year. The changes in Stage23 and 
Stage4 scores, however, did not achieve statistical significance.   
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Research Question 1b 
 What, if any, statistically significant differences exist between the moral judgment 
of LSP Seminary students of different personality types? 
 
 This question was intended to facilitate the interpretation of moral judgment 
scores. As reported in Chapter 2, many researchers have found personality types to affect 
moral judgment. Further, the personality types typical of prisoners and vocational 
ministers were frequently associated with lower levels of moral judgment. Understanding 
the personality types of LSP Seminary students and any effects those types had on moral 
development would be beneficial to determining the success of the LSP Seminary 
program in promoting higher-level moral judgment. 
 The LSP Seminary population consisted of 101 students, 98 of whom completed 
the MBTI instrument. The results of the MBTI administration included classification of 
the dichotomy preferences for each participant as well as the classification of each 
participant’s overall personality type. The personality type distributions among the 
participants are displayed in Table 10. Nearly half (44.9%) of LSP Seminary students 
were represented by just two of the sixteen types: ISTJ and ESTJ. This table shows the 
self-selection ratio of each category compared with the norms for male college students, 
shown in Chapter 2. Self-selection ratio scores above 1.0 indicate over-representation of 
the preference among the LSP Seminary population.  
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Table 10  
Participants’ Personality Type Distributions (N = 98) 
Personality Types N % Self-Selection Ratio 
ISTJ 27 27.55 2.21 
ISFJ 10 10.20 1.88 
INFJ 1 1.02 0.38 
INTJ 7 6.14 1.14 
ISTP 3 3.06 0.45 
ISFP 4 4.08 1.00 
INFP 2 2.04 0.38 
INTP 3 3.06 0.46 
ESTP 1 1.02 0.15 
ESFP 4 4.08 0.93 
ENFP 1 1.02 0.16 
ENTP 2 2.04 0.30 
ESTJ 17 17.35 1.35 
ESFJ 13 13.27 2.43 
ENFJ 0 0.00 0.00 
ENTJ 3 2.04 0.35 
 
Note. Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) types are comprised of: N=Intuition, S=Sensing, T=Thinking, 
F=Feeling, E=Extraverts, I=Introverts, J=Judging, P=Perceiving. 
 
Table 11 displays the distribution of personality dichotomies. The four Sensing-
Judging (S-J) personality types comprised the four most overrepresented types among 
Angola students. The four personality types most under-represented among the inmates 
were all Intuitive (N) types.  
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Table 11  
Distribution of Personality Dichotomies (N = 98) 
Indicators N % Self-Selection Ratio 
Extraversion (E) 41 41.84 0.82 
Introversion (I) 57 58.16 1.19 
Intuition (N) 19 19.34 0.46 
Sensing (S) 79 80.61 1.38 
Thinking (T) 63 64.29 1.01 
Feeling (F) 35 35.71 0.98 
Judging (J) 78 79.59 1.50 
Perceiving (P) 20 20.41 0.43 
 
 Temperament and Spirituality distributions are shown in Table 12. The most 
common Temperament was SJ, represented by 68.37% of the sample. The Introversion 
(I), Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were overrepresented among this sample. As 
was shown in Chapter 2, previous researchers found the Sensing and Judging preferences 
to be predictors of lower P scores and higher religiosity. Previous researchers have also 
found the Introversion and Sensing preferences to be overrepresented among prisoners. 
This study supported those previous findings. 
 
Table 12  
Participants’ Temperament and Spirituality Distribution (N = 98) 
Type N %
Temperaments 
Sensing Judging (SJ) 67 68.37
Sensing Perceiving (SP) 12 12.24
Intuition Thinking (NT) 15 15.31
Intuition Feeling (NF) 4 4.08
Spiritualities 
Intuition Feeling (NF) 4 4.08
Intuition Thinking (NT) 15 15.31
Sensing Feeling (SF) 31 31.63
Sensing Thinking (ST) 48 48.98
 
 128
Research Question 1b was designed to provide further evidence needed to 
determine the LSP Seminary’s effectiveness in promoting moral development. The data 
were analyzed to determine what, if any, statistically significant differences exist in moral 
judgment scores based upon personality types. Mean P scores for each dichotomy are 
displayed in Table 13. Because several of the 16 personality types were represented by 
just one or two students, the researcher chose to not include P score means by types. This 
cautious decision was made to ensure confidentiality of assessment results.  
The sample size for comparisons of type and P scores was reduced to 91 or 90% 
of the population. The sample size for Research Question 1b was smaller than the overall 
sample sizes because not all participants agreed to complete both instruments and three 
DIT-2 scores were rejected by the internal reliability controls.  
 
Table 13  
Mean P Scores for Personality Dichotomies (N = 98) 
Indicators N m sd 
Extraverts 37 25.34 13.40548 
Introverts 54 28.65 12.50986 
Intuition 18 30.99 12.15744 
Sensing 73 26.39 13.00952 
Thinking 59 28.31 11.79711 
Feeling 32 25.45 14.76865 
Judging 73 26.91 12.24905 
Perceiving 18 28.91 15.61170 
 
 To answer Research Question 1b, independent t-tests were conducted for each of 
the four dichotomies, and ANOVAs were conducted for the four Temperaments and the 
four Spiritualities. P scores served as the dependent variables; personality preferences 
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were used as independent variables. Mean P scores for each Temperament and 
Spirituality are shown in Table 14. No statistically significant differences were found in P 
scores based on any of the dichotomies, the Temperaments or the Spiritualities.  
 
Table 14  
Participants’ Temperament and Spirituality P Scores 
Type N              m          sd 
Temperaments  
Sensing Judging (SJ) 63 26.26 12.21948
Sensing Perceiving (SP) 10 27.23 18.01284
Intuition Thinking (NT) 14 34.00 12.07508
Intuition Feeling (NF) 4 20.50 4.12311
Spiritualities  
Intuition Feeling (NF) 4 20.50 4.12311
Intuition Thinking (NT) 15 34.00 12.07508
Sensing Feeling (SF) 31 26.15 15.63310
Sensing Thinking (ST) 48 26.54 11.26595
Faculty Data 
 Since it was necessary to determine what levels of moral reasoning were 
consistent with program goals and Baptist theology prior to answering the Primary 
Research Question, faculty data were also sought. The researcher chose to ask a sample 
of NOBTS full-time faculty members to complete the DIT-2. In addition to the student 
responses, 30 full-time NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2.  
The faculty members contacted for participation included 15 administrators who 
held faculty rank and 15 non-administrative professors. Of the 15 administrative faculty 
members, four agreed to participate, for a response rate of 27%. Of the 15 randomly 
selected non-administrative faculty members, 2 agreed to participate, for a response rate 
of 13%. These responses represented 9% of the total NOBTS full-time faculty.  
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Response rates for faculty members were low, overall. Because the faculty 
member data were to be used only for benchmarking, the response rates were deemed 
sufficient for this evaluation. The low response rates might be attributable to the time 
requirements of the DIT-2 and the stressors undoubtedly facing faculty members still 
recovering from Hurricane Katrina. 
The mean P score of NOBTS faculty members was 34.02 (sd = 15.25). A P score 
of 34.02 was lower than the average scores for American adults (m = 42.8) and 
Americans with research doctoral degrees who self-reported conservative political views 
(m = 43.85) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). A mean of 34.02 was also lower than the mean 
score of 35.17 (sd = 11.69) Nelson (2004) reported for Bible college students. Faculty 
scores ranged from 12 to 52.  
Summary 
 The analysis of data for Research Questions 1a and 1b has been reported in 
Chapter 4 along with relevant data obtained from faculty members. In Chapter 5, the 
results of the study, focused around the Primary Research Question, will be addressed.  
Chapter 5 will include a summary and discussion of findings.  Limitations of the study 
and recommendations for future research will also be presented.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary 
at LSP. The Primary Research Question in this study addressed the extent to which 
students in the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with 
program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. Data 
gathered in the analysis of Research Questions 1a and 1b, as well as data gathered from 
NOBTS full-time faculty members, were useful in formulating a response to the single 
larger issue posed in this program evaluation. 
 Research Question 1a asked what, if any, statistically significant differences exist 
in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary 
students. Differences in P scores did not achieve statistical significance; after removing 
two outliers, however, there was some indication that significant differences might exist 
between the freshman and junior years.  
 Research Question 1b asked what, if any, statistically significant differences exist 
between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types. No 
statistically significant type differences were found in moral reasoning of LSP Seminary 
students. While mean P scores by personality type did reveal some of the hypothesized 
differences, such as Intuitive Thinkers (NTs) scoring higher than other types, none of 
those differences reached significance.  
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 In addition to Research Questions 1a and 1b, moral reasoning data were gathered 
from several NOBTS faculty members. The mean P score among faculty was 34.02 (sd = 
15.25), with scores ranging from 12 to 52. The faculty data were incorporated with other 
data to address the Primary Research Question. 
Summary and Discussion of Findings for the Primary Research Question 
 To answer the Primary Research Question, it was necessary to determine what 
levels of moral reasoning were consistent with program goals and Baptist theology. In 
order to reach this determination, the researcher chose to ask a sample of NOBTS full-
time faculty members to complete the DIT-2.  
The mean P score of NOBTS faculty members was 34.02 (sd = 15.25). A P score 
of 34.02 was lower than the average scores for American adults (m = 42.8) and 
Americans with research doctoral degrees who self-reported conservative political views 
(m = 43.85) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). A mean of 34.02 was also lower than the mean 
score of 35.17 (sd = 11.69) reported for Bible college students (Nelson, 2004). Faculty 
scores ranged from 12 to 52.  
Comparisons of students’ scores with various norms constituted a factor in 
answering the Primary Research Question. According to Rest (1979b), prisoners had 
been found to have a mean P score of 23.5. In this study, the freshman mean P score was 
24.56. That score was reduced to 22.15 after removing the outliers. The LSP Seminary 
students were determined to have begun the program at approximately the expected level 
of moral reasoning. By the junior year, however, the mean P score of students was 30.27.  
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In regard to the extent to which students in the NOBTS program at LSP 
developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and 
preparing them for effective ministry, the researcher concluded differences in P scores 
among LSP Seminary students matched expectations for a successful program. Statistical 
significance was not achieved with the differences, however, unless outliers were 
removed. The differences in the mean P scores of students were greater than those 
typically reported in evaluations of college students. Freshman LSP Seminary students 
demonstrated at a level of moral reasoning equivalent to middle-income junior high 
school students (m = 23.4), while juniors scored equivalent to conservative community 
college students (m = 30.75) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).  
The results of MBTI assessments were also used to evaluate moral development 
respective to program goals. As described in Chapter 2, the demographics of LSP 
Seminary students were predictive of personality preferences related to lower levels of 
moral reasoning. In fact, preferences for Sensing (S) and Judging (J) were 
overrepresented among the LSP Seminary students. Past researchers have correlated the S 
and J preferences with lower P scores, and similar results were observed in this 
population. Type differences in P scores appeared as predicted with Introverts (I) scoring 
higher than Extraverts (E), Intuitives (N) scoring higher than Sensors (S), Thinkers (T) 
scoring higher than Feelers (F) and Perceivers (P) scoring higher than Judgers (J). 
Differences in mean P scores by preferences, however, did not meet the standard for less 
than 5% chance of Type I error. This means the relationship between moral development 
and personality type may be due to random error. 
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Despite the MBTI data failing to meet statistical significance, the data did fit the 
limited research available concerning other incarcerated men. The data also fit the 
findings of previous researchers who investigated personality and moral development. 
Therefore, while acknowledging the statistical chance results were caused by random 
error, it is reasonable to conclude LSP Seminary students do typically have personality 
preferences related to lower moral reasoning.   
To answer the Primary Research Question, the results of Research Questions 1a 
and 1b were combined with the results of faculty evaluations. The analysis of Research 
Question 1a was not statistically significant unless two outliers were removed from the 
freshmen scores. The data observed matched expectations and after removing outliers 
there was an indication that statistically significant differences might exist among the 
class years. Further, the differences in moral reasoning were socially meaningful. 
Freshmen demonstrated moral reasoning typical of prisoners and junior high school 
students, while juniors demonstrated reasoning more typical of conservative community 
college students. Further, upper-level students used moral reasoning similar to some 
faculty members.  
The moral reasoning of teachers was a powerful influence on the moral 
development of students (Bar-Yam et al., 1980). Freshman LSP Seminary students 
demonstrated a mean P score approximately 12 points below the mean score for faculty. 
The mean P score for juniors, however, was just 4 points below the mean for faculty.  
According to Rest (1974), any program that could result in even modest moral 
gains among the “extremely problematic” population of prison inmates would be 
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“spectacular” (p. 250). In this study, the differences in moral reasoning found among LSP 
Seminary students were larger than those typical for college students. This evaluation, 
however, was only a cross-sectional study and the results cannot be generalized beyond 
this sample. Much more research is needed before reasonable claims may be made 
concerning program success. This study should be an impetus for such research.  
Study Limitations 
The use of faculty scores had significant limitations. The faculty invited to 
participate included full-time faculty on the Seminary’s main campus. Some of those 
faculty members had taught at LSP, while others had not taught at LSP. Some LSP 
courses had been taught by adjunct faculty. Further, the main campus of NOBTS offers 
several majors not offered at LSP; some main campus faculty taught in curricular majors, 
such as music and women’s ministry, that were not part of the Angola program. 
Consequently, the faculty scores provided inferential evidence, at best, for the teaching at 
Angola. Finally, the response rate of faculty invited to participate was sufficiently low to 
raise reasonable doubt as to the generalizability of scores. The wide range of P scores 
among faculty members made generalizability even more difficult.  
Despite the limitations of the faculty data, the researcher believed faculty scores 
were valuable as a secondary source of information for evaluating the effectiveness of the 
LSP Seminary program. The faculty data were not essential to measuring the moral 
development of LSP students, but the faculty data were used to better understand the 
nature of the moral reasoning consistent with the LSP Seminary’s goals.  
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Implications for Policy and Practice 
This study stood to fill a gap in research. The Seminary at LSP had been in 
operation for a decade without a significant program evaluation. No research had been 
conducted on the LSP Seminary program and little research had been conducted 
concerning moral rehabilitation of prisoners or the personality types of prisoners. 
Consequently, the praise given to the program by correctional officials, Seminary 
officials and the media was based largely on anecdotal information. Even with this study 
completed, more research is warranted for the program. Research is especially warranted 
in light of the program model’s expansion into other states. This study should serve as an 
impetus for new research, which may help investigators support or refine the conclusions 
reported in this study. 
At the present time, this study may serve policy-makers and stakeholders as 
evidence that continued support for this program is defensible. Perhaps more importantly, 
this study may provide necessary details for improving the program curriculum and 
achievement of student-learning outcomes.  
One of the best ways for students to develop higher levels of moral judgment is to 
be exposed to higher-level reasoning. Because the faculty members scored higher, on 
average, than students, the faculty could potentially teach at levels above student 
reasoning. Such teaching would be conducive to development of students’ moral 
reasoning. At the same time, the relatively low scores of faculty could pose a practical, 
and rather low, limit for student development. Course curricula, including exposure to 
philosophical and theological texts, may provide additional opportunities for students to 
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be exposed to principled thinking. Further, the wide range of scores found among 
students could allow significant moral dialogue inside and outside of classes.  
Public policy addressing prisoner rehabilitation was important considering 
America’s high rate of incarceration. Previous researchers often found little gain from 
prison education and the federal government discontinued support for post-secondary 
prisoner education. The LSP Seminary program may provide a model for how prison 
rehabilitation might be successful.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
This dissertation was narrowly focused on the single program goal of moral 
development. That focus was chosen because it was an often-cited goal of the program 
and had significant saliency for correctional leaders, policymakers, stakeholders, and the 
public. An LSP Seminary program evaluation could have been targeted at numerous 
other goals. Further research is warranted for the Angola program.  
Because this dissertation was a cross-sectional study involving students from the 
fall 2005 semester, conclusions cannot be generalized beyond the specific sample. A 
longitudinal investigation may be especially beneficial in the case of the LSP Seminary. 
This researcher found a wide range of scores among students in each of the four class 
years; further, the two highest scores were found among freshmen. A longitudinal study 
might allow more accurate assessment of students’ moral development.   
 A longitudinal study would allow assessment of how a student’s moral reasoning 
at entry into the program affects the student’s moral reasoning as a senior or at 
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graduation. Those entering with low scores have ample room for improvement during the 
college years. Conversely, this researcher can provide no indication what might happen to 
the two freshmen whose P scores were already extremely high. If Richards (1991) was 
correct, and Christian college students learn to reject higher levels of reasoning, the 
outliers’ scores might actually decrease. This possibility seemed especially significant 
considering many students scored higher than most faculty members. 
 Although a very low percentage of Angola inmates are released from 
incarceration, an investigation of program gradates’ recidivism could shed light on 
whether the moral development of students relates to improvements in behavior. The DIT 
was a measure of moral reasoning, rather than moral action. There was evidence the LSP 
environment had changed from frequent violence to relative calm during the years the 
Seminary has been operating at LSP. No definite connection can be made, however, 
between behavioral changes among Angola residents and the moral development of LSP 
Seminary students. 
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APPENDIX A: DEFINING ISSUES TEST 2 
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This questionnaire is concerned with how you define the issues in a social 
problem. Several stories about social problems will be described. After each story, there 
will be a list of questions. The questions that follow each story represent different issues 
that might be raised by the problem. In other words, the questionnaire/issues raise 
different ways of judging what is important in making a decision about the social 
problem. You will be asked to rate and rank the questions in terms of how important each 
one seems to you. 
  
This questionnaire is in two parts; one part contains the INSTRUCTIONS (this 
part) and the stories presenting the social problems; the other part contains the questions 
(issues) and the ANSWER SHEET on which to write your responses. 
 
Here is an example of the task: 
 
Presidential Election 
 
Imagine that you are about to vote for a candidate for the Presidency of the United 
States. Imagine that before you vote, you are given several questions, and asked which 
issue is the most important to you in making up your mind about which candidate to vote 
for. In this example, 5 items are given. On a rating scale of 1 to 5 (1=Great, 2=Much, 
3=Some, 4=Little, 5=No) please rate the importance of the item (issue) by filling in with 
a pencil one of the bubbles on the answer sheet by each item. 
 
Assume that you thought that item #1 (below) was of great importance, item #2 
had some importance, item #3 had no importance, item #4 had much importance, and 
item #5 had much importance. Then you would fill in the bubbles on the answer sheet as 
shown below. 
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 Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5) 
X     1. Financially are you personally better off now than you were 
four years ago? 
  X   2. Does one candidate have a superior personal moral 
character? 
    X 3. Which candidate stands the tallest? 
 X    4. Which candidate would make the best world leader? 
 X    5. Which candidate has the best ideas for our country’s 
internal problems, like crime and health care? 
 
Further, the questionnaire will ask you to rank the question in terms of 
importance. In the space below, the numbers at the top, 1 through 12, represent the item 
number. From top to bottom, you are asked to fill in the bubble that represents the item in 
first importance (of those given to you to choose from), then second most important, third 
most important, and fourth most important. Please indicate your top four choices. You 
might fill out this part, as follows: 
 
_1_  Most important item   _5_  Second most important   
_4_  Third most important  _2_  Fourth most important 
 
Note that some of the items may seem irrelevant to you (as in item #3) or not 
make sense to you—in that case, rate the item as “no” importance and do not rank the 
item. Note that in the stories that follow, there will be 12 items for each story, not five. 
Please make sure to consider all 12 items (questions) that are printed after each story. 
 
In addition you will be asked to state your preference for what action to take in 
the story. After the story, you will be asked to indicate the action you favor on a seven-
point scale (1= strongly favor some action, 7=strongly oppose the action). 
 
In short, read the story from this booklet, then fill out your answers on the answer 
sheet. Please use a #2 pencil. If you change your mind about a response, erase the pencil 
mark cleanly and enter your new response. 
 
[Notice the second part of this questionnaire, the Answer Sheet. The Identification 
Number at the top of the answer sheet may already be filled in when you receive your 
materials. If not, you will receive instructions about how to fill in the number. If you have 
questions about the procedure, please ask now.  
 
Please turn now to the Answer Sheet] 
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Famine—(Story #1) 
 
The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but 
this year’s famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves 
by making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh’s family is near starvation. He has heard 
that a rich man in his village has supplies of food stored away and is hoarding food while 
its price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate 
and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man’s warehouse. The small amount of 
food that he needs for his family probably wouldn’t even be missed. 
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What should Mustaq Singh do? Do you favor the action of taking the food (Mark one.) 
___ Should take the food  
___ Can’t decide  
___ Should not take the food 
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 Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5) 
     1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught 
for stealing? 
     2. Isn’t it only natural for a lovin g father to care so much for 
his family that he would steal? 
     3. Shouldn’t the community’s laws be upheld? 
     4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup 
from tree bark? 
     5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when 
other people are starving? 
     6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to 
steal for his family? 
     7. What values are going to be the basis for social 
cooperation? 
     8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with t he culpability 
of stealing? 
     9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so 
greedy? 
     10. Isn’t private property an institution to enable the rich to 
exploit the poor? 
     11. Would stealing bring about more total good for 
everybody concerned or wouldn’t it? 
     12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of 
any member of a society? 
 
From the list above, select the four most important: 
___  Most important item   ___  Second most important   
___ Third most important   ___  Fourth most important 
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Reporter—(Story #2) 
 
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a 
decade. Almost by accident, she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant 
Governor for her state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting 20 years 
earlier. Reporter Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson had 
undergone a confused period and done things he later regretted, actions which would be 
very out -of-character now. His shop-lifting had been a minor offense and charges had 
been dropped by the department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself out 
since then, but built a distinguished record in helping many people and in leading 
constructive community projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best 
candidate in the field and likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state. 
Reporter Dayton wonders whether or not she should write the story about Thompson’s 
earlier troubles because in the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a 
news story could wreck Thompson’s chance to win. 
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Do you favor the action of reporting the story? (Mark one.) 
___ Should report the story   
___ Can’t decide    
___ Should not report the story 
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 Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5) 
     1. Doesn’t the public have a right to know all the facts about 
all candidates for office? 
     2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton’s 
reputation for investigative reporting? 
     3. If Dayton doesn’t publish the story wouldn’t another 
reporter get the story anyway and get the credit for 
investigative reporting? 
     4. Since the voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any 
difference what reporter Dayton does? 
     5. Hasn’t Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a 
better person than in his earlier days as a shop-lifter? 
     6. What would best serve society? 
     7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it? 
     8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to 
report the damaging story about candidate Thompson? 
     9. Does the right of “habeas corpus” apply in this case? 
     10. Would the election process be more fair with or without 
reporting the story? 
     11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in 
the same way by reporting everything she learns about them, 
good and bad? 
     12. Isn’t it a reporter’s duty to report all the news regardless 
of the circumstances? 
 
From the list above, select the four most important: 
___  Most important item   ___  Second most important   
___  Third most important  ___  Fourth most important 
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School Board—(Story #3) 
 
Mr. Grant has been elected to School Board District 190 and was chosen to be 
Chairman. The district is bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools. One 
of the high schools has to be closed for financial reasons, but there is no agreement over 
which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant had proposed a 
series of “Open Meetings” in which members of the community could voice their 
opinions. He hoped that the dialogue would make the community realize the necessity of 
closing one high school. Also he hoped that through open discussions, the difficulty of 
the decision would be appreciated, and that the community would ultimately support the 
school board decision. The first Open Meeting was a disaster. Passionate speeches 
dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed without 
fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone calls. 
Mr. Grant wonder if he ought to call off the next Open Meeting. 
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Do you favor calling off the next Open Meeting? (Mark one.) 
___ Should call of the next open meeting  
___ Can’t decide  
___ Should have the next open meeting 
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 Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5) 
     1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have Open Meetings on 
major school board decisions? 
     2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign 
promises to the community by discounting the Open 
Meetings? 
     3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grant if 
he stopped the Open Meetings? 
     4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment? 
     5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have 
the legal authority to protect the Board by making decisions 
in closed meetings? 
     6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he 
stopped the open meetings? 
     7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for 
ensuring that divergent views are heard? 
     8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers 
from the meetings or prevent them from making long 
speeches? 
     9. Are some people deliberately undermining the school 
board process by playing some sort of power game? 
     10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the 
community’s ability to handle controversial issues in the 
future? 
     11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads, and is 
the community in general really fair-minded and democratic? 
     12. What is the likelihood that a good decision could be made 
without open discussion from the community? 
 
From the list above, select the four most important: 
___  Most important item   ___  Second most important   
___  Third most important  ___  Fourth most important 
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Cancer—(Story #4) 
 
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in 
terrible pain and asks the doctor to give her more pain -killer medicine. The doctor has 
given her the maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because 
it would probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says 
that she realizes this, but wants to end her suffering even if it means ending her life. 
Should the doctor give her an increased dosage? 
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Do you favor the action of giving more medicine? (Mark one.) 
___ Should give Mrs. Bennett an increased dosage to make her die  
___ Can’t decide  
___ Should not give her an increased dosage 
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 Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5) 
     1. Isn’t the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody 
else if giving an overdose would be the same as killing her? 
     2. Wouldn’t society be better off without so many laws about 
what doctors can and cannot do? 
     3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally 
responsible for malpractice? 
     4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get 
more painkiller medicine? 
     5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug? 
     6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence 
on those who don’t want to live? 
     7. Is helping to end another’s life ever a responsible act of 
cooperation? 
     8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett 
by giving the medicine or not? 
     9. Wouldn’t the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett 
so much drug that she died? 
     10. Should only God decide when a person’s life should end? 
     11. Shouldn’t society protect everyone against being killed? 
     12. Where should society draw the line between protecting 
life and allowing someone to die if the person wants to? 
 
From the list above, select the four most important: 
___  Most important item   ___  Second most important   
___  Third most important  ___  Fourth most important 
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Demonstration—(Story #5) 
 
Political and economic instability in a South America country prompted the 
President of the United States to send troops to “police” the area. Students at many 
campuses in the U.S.A. have protested that the United States is using its military might 
for economic advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational 
companies are pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means 
loss of life. Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstration, tying up traffic 
and stopping regular business in the town. The president of the university demanded that 
the students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college’s 
administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the students right to 
demonstrate in these ways? 
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Do you favor the action of demonstrating in this way? 
___ Should continue demonstrating in these ways  
___ Can’t decide  
___ Should not continue demonstrating in these ways 
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 Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5) 
     1. Do the students have the right to take over property that 
doesn’t belong to them? 
     2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and 
fined, and even expelled from school? 
     3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they doing 
it just for fun? 
     4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will 
it lead to more disorder? 
     5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few 
student demonstrators? 
     6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of 
the multinational oil companies? 
     7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business 
leaders have more power than ordinary people?  
     8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less 
good in the long run to all people? 
     9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience? 
     10. Shouldn’t the authorities be respected by students? 
     11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of 
justice? 
     12. Isn’t it everyone’s duty to obey the law, whether one 
likes it or not? 
 
From the list above, select the four most important: 
___  Most important item   ___  Second most important   
___  Third most important  ___  Fourth most important 
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Bruce M. Sabin 
[address] 
 
[date] 
 
Dear Leavell College student: 
 
I graduated from Leavell College in 2000 and I am now a student at the University of Central Florida. With 
the support of my advisor, Dr. LeVester Tubbs, I am working on a research project for my degree. I am 
asking for your help with my research.  
 
The purpose of my research is to learn about your college program at Angola. If you agree to participate, 
you will complete two surveys. I will visit your class later this semester. The students who volunteer to 
participate will complete two surveys at that time. You do not have to participate in my surveys, and if you 
agree to participate now, you are free to change your mind later.  
 
The first survey is called the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2). This survey asks for your thoughts concerning 
how to handle social problems. You and your fellow students can provide important information on those 
topics because you are preparing to become leaders in your community.  The DIT-2 will take about 45 
minutes. The DIT-2 was written to understand how different people think about social problems.  
 
Various people around the country and in many walks of life have responded to the DIT-2. It is important 
for you to know the DIT-2 asks questions about difficult social problems. But, that is why I think it is 
important to understand how community leaders like you think about these issues. If you agree to take the 
survey, you may choose not to answer any questions you do not want to answer. If you want to talk about 
the issues after the survey, there are people, such as your chaplains, professors and ministers, who would be 
available to you. 
 
The second survey is called the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). The MBTI is designed to help 
people understand their own natural personalities and how God has made us. The MBTI will probably take 
about 30 minutes of your time. Later this year, I will visit Angola again to give a workshop to those 
students who participated in the MBTI. At the workshop, students will learn about the results of the MBTI 
and how learning about personalities can help us understand ourselves and others, especially in terms of our 
ministries. That workshop will take about 4 hours. Even if you agree to participate in my surveys, you do 
not have to come to the workshop. If you agree to come, though, I think you will have a good time and 
learn a lot. The workshop will be my way of thanking your for your help.  
 
If you agree to participate, you will complete the surveys during your regular class time. Participating in 
my research is not required by your college or your class and will not affect your grades or any other 
status at Angola. This is completely voluntary to help me with my research project. The only direct benefit 
for you may be the opportunity to learn about personalities during the workshop later in the year. No other 
compensation is offered for your participation. 
 
I will respect your privacy and will keep your personal survey responses absolutely private. I will keep 
your individual survey responses in a secure place. Only I will see your personal answers to the surveys. 
Any results of my research seen by other people at the College or Angola will be general information about 
students in the program, not about you personally. The surveys you complete will not have your name on 
them. Instead of a name, they will have a special number I create for you and that only I can connect to you 
personally. I will keep your personal information completely confidential. 
 
Remember, whether or not you agree to help with this research is completely up to you. If you agree now, 
you can always change your mind later. And even when taking the surveys, you will not have to answer 
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any questions you do not want to answer. If you choose not to participate, you will be able to study in the 
library during the surveys.  
 
Please check the box for whether you would like to participate or would not like to participate. I have also 
asked whether you would be willing to let me contact you in the future for other research projects. If you 
agree to let me contact you in the future, you are only agreeing to let me contact you and you are not 
making any promise to participate in those projects. If I contact you in the future, you will again have the 
opportunity to volunteer to participate or choose not to participate in those future projects. Please check the 
box for whether you agree to let me contact you again, or would rather not be contacted again. Then, sign 
and date the letter and return it to Dr. Robson, who is collecting these for me. I have also provided an extra 
copy of this letter for you to keep.  
 
If you have any questions, you may ask Dr. Robson, who can pass the questions along to me, or you can 
write to me directly at the address below me name. You may also contact the University of Central 
Florida’s Institutional Review Board with any questions about your rights in this research. The Board’s 
address is: the UCFIRB office, University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 
12443 Research Parkway, Suite 302, Orlando, FL 32826. 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Bruce M. Sabin 
 
[address] 
 
Do you volunteer to participate in this research project? 
 
  I have read the information above and I voluntarily agree to participate in  
     the research. I have also received a copy of this letter. 
 
  I have read the information above and I choose not to participate in the  
              research. I have also received a copy of this letter. 
 
May I contact you in the future about other research projects? 
 
  I voluntarily agree to give permission to be contacted in the future for other   
       research projects. 
 
  I choose not to give permission to be contacted about future research projects. 
 
______________________________________                   ___________________ 
Signature        Date 
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Bruce M. Sabin 
[address] 
(h) [home telephone number] 
(w) [work telephone number] 
[e-mail address] 
 
[date] 
 
Dear Dr. [name]: 
 
I graduated from Leavell College in 2000 and I am now a doctoral student at the University of Central 
Florida. With the support of my advisor, Dr. LeVester Tubbs, I am working on working on my dissertation, 
which is a study an evaluation of Leavell’s Angola campus. I am asking for your help with my research.  
 
In my research, I am using the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) to investigate the moral reasoning of the 
Angola students. In order to establish a benchmark for students, I would like you and other NOBTS faculty 
to complete the DIT-2. I am presuming you and your colleagues represent the highest standards of Baptist 
thinking on moral issues.  
 
The DIT-2 is a paper-and-pencil survey and should take between 30 and 45 minutes. I realize that is a 
substantial amount of your time, but I hope you will contribute to my research. Of course, your 
participation is completely voluntary. 
 
Enclosed with this letter is the DIT-2 question booklet, an answer sheet, and a return envelope. If you 
choose to participate, please complete the DIT-2 and return the documents, including this informed consent 
letter, in the provided envelope. The answer sheet has a unique identification number I created for you. 
Only I can connect your number with your answers, and I will keep your results completely confidential. 
Any results reported will be in the form of aggregated data. Enclosed with these documents, I have also 
included a copy of this letter for you to keep. If you choose not to participate, I hope you will still complete 
this informed consent letter and return the incomplete documents. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact me at the telephone number or address information at the top of 
this letter. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCFIRB office, 
University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 
207, Orlando, FL 32826. 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Bruce M. Sabin 
Leavell College ’00 
 
  I have read the information above and I voluntarily agree to participate in the  
       research. I have also received a copy of this letter. 
 
  I have read the information above and I choose not to participate in the  
       research. I have also received a copy of this letter. 
 
______________________________________                   ___________________ 
Signature        Date 
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APPENDIX D: STUDENT DEFINING ISSUES TEST 2 DATA 
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Case P Score Stage23 Stage4
Freshmen    
101 0.0 48.0 50.0
102 2.0 48.0 38.0
103 8.0 34.0 48.0
104 8.5 10.6 74.5
105 12.0 42.0 32.0
106 12.0 28.0 56.0
107 12.0 20.0 68.0
108 14.0 32.0 42.0
109 16.0 22.0 48.0
110 18.0 16.0 50.0
111 18.0 40.0 42.0
112 18.0 12.0 70.0
113 18.0 26.0 48.0
114 20.0 14.0 66.0
115 20.0 18.0 52.0
116 22.0 20.0 58.0
117 22.0 32.0 46.0
118 22.0 38.0 30.0
119 22.0 22.0 56.0
120 22.0 46.0 20.0
121 24.0 24.0 52.0
122 24.0 32.0 44.0
123 24.0 24.0 46.0
124 28.0 48.0 16.0
125 30.0 30.0 24.0
126 36.0 0.0 64.0
127 36.0 34.0 16.0
128 40.0 6.0 50.0
129 42.0 34.0 22.0
130 46.0 6.0 40.0
131 50.0 26.0 22.0
132 58.0 24.0 18.0
133 66.0 8.0 22.0
    
Sophomores    
201 8.0 24.0 68.0
202 16.0 24.0 56.0
203 16.0 38.0 40.0
204 22.0 38.0 40.0
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Case P Score Stage23 Stage4 
205 24.0 12.0 60.0
206 24.0 28.0 38.0
207 28.0 22.0 50.0
208 28.0 14.0 58.0
209 32.0 18.0 50.0
210 34.0 26.0 40.0
211 36.0 18.0 40.0
212 38.3 4.3 57.5
    
Juniors    
301 8.0 40.0 50.0
302 16.0 24.0 54.0
303 16.0 18.0 66.0
304 16.0 20.0 60.0
305 18.0 22.0 42.0
306 20.0 36.0 42.0
307 20.0 26.0 52.0
308 22.0 34.0 40.0
309 22.0 12.0 64.0
310 24.0 34.0 42.0
311 24.0 14.0 62.0
312 26.0 18.0 56.0
313 28.0 36.0 32.0
314 28.0 28.0 42.0
315 30.0 16.0 50.0
316 32.0 40.0 26.0
317 36.0 34.0 30.0
318 36.0 20.0 40.0
319 38.0 16.0 36.0
320 42.9 4.1 53.1
321 46.0 8.0 42.0
322 48.0 16.0 34.0
323 52.0 18.0 22.0
324 54.0 6.0 34.0
325 54.0 10.0 30.0
 
Seniors 
401 10.0 22.0 62.0
402 14.0 38.0 46.0
403 22.0 16.0 44.0
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Case P Score Stage23 Stage4
404 22.0 8.0 56.0
405 22.0 10.0 66.0
406 22.0 6.0 70.0
407 22.0 14.0 64.0
408 25.0 32.5 42.5
409 26.0 40.0 34.0
410 28.0 12.0 54.0
411 28.0 28.0 44.0
412 28.0 8.0 64.0
413 28.0 42.0 26.0
414 30.0 10.0 54.0
415 30.0 48.0 20.0
416 32.0 14.0 52.0
417 36.0 30.0 24.0
418 40.0 34.0 20.0
419 40.0 12.0 48.0
420 44.0 24.0 28.0
421 46.0 12.0 42.0
422 48.0 8.0 38.0
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